| People v Rosa |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 00127 [47 AD3d 1009] |
| January 10, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Miguel Rosa,Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert M. Carney, District Attorney, Schenectady (Alfred D. Chapleau of counsel), forrespondent.
Peters, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Catena, J.),rendered September 12, 2003, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of burglary in thesecond degree.
In the early morning hours of July 20, 2002, defendant and two others entered the victim'sapartment and removed appliances and furniture. A neighbor, who saw defendant removing theitems, called the police. Upon their arrival, they spoke with defendant who explained that thevictim was in custody and had asked him to watch her apartment and take care of her property.Later that day, the victim, who had not been incarcerated, discovered the burglary. Upon aninvestigation, stolen items stored by defendant were retrieved. Following a jury trial, defendantwas convicted of burglary in the second degree. He was sentenced as a second felony offender toa term of imprisonment of nine years, with five years of postrelease supervision. He appeals.
Addressing first defendant's challenge to County Court's Sandoval ruling, we find noerror or abuse of discretion. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree in 1978and sentenced to a prison term of 8 to 24 years. He was paroled after eight years but thereafterincarcerated on seven separate occasions for violations of parole. In a 1997 arrest while onparole, he was charged with burglary, later pleading guilty to criminal trespass. After this [*2]evidence was presented at a Sandoval hearing, the Peoplewere permitted to inquire whether defendant had been convicted of a felony in 1978, had hisparole revoked seven times, and was convicted of criminal trespass in 1997. Defendant'sassertion that the convictions were too remote in time is unpersuasive, since incarceration maytoll periods of time when assessing remoteness (see People v Gilliam, 36 AD3d 1151, 1153 [2007], lvdenied 8 NY3d 946 [2007]; Peoplev Mack, 6 AD3d 551, 552 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 660 [2004]).
Next assessing the sufficiency and weight of the evidence used to support the conviction ofburglary in the second degree, we find that the testimony of the victim, her neighbor, thecodefendant, the police officers who spoke with defendant both before and after his arrest, anddefendant's former wife constitute legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding thatdefendant knowingly entered and remained unlawfully in the victim's apartment and removedproperty from her residence. Moreover, upon our independent review of this evidence in a neutrallight, giving appropriate deference to the credibility determinations of the jury, we find theverdict to be supported by the weight of the evidence (see People v Camerena, 42 AD3d 814, 815 [2007], lvdenied 9 NY3d 921 [2007]).
Having reviewed and rejected defendant's remaining contentions as lacking in merit, weaffirm.
Cardona, P.J., Spain, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.