| People v Scott |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 00131 [47 AD3d 1016] |
| January 10, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Joel Scott,Appellant. |
—[*1] P. David Soares, District Attorney, Albany (Alison M. Thorne of counsel), forrespondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Breslin, J.),rendered March 14, 2005, upon a verdict convicting defendant of two counts of the crime ofmurder in the first degree.
Early one morning while separately walking their dogs in a city park, two eyewitnessesreported having seen a large African-American male, who was wearing a blue shirt and nakedfrom the waist down, punching a person who was laying beneath him and moving his body asthough he were engaging in sexual intercourse. Arriving at the scene, police officers observeddefendant, who was wearing a blue shirt, jump up from a prone position and flee while trying topull up his pants, which had been down around his ankles. After the officers caught defendant,they returned to where they first saw him and found the body of the female victim naked from thewaist down, beaten and covered with blood. Thereafter, defendant made incriminating statementsto the police. Following a jury trial on the resulting charges of murder, attempted rape andattempted sexual abuse, defendant was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree.County Court later sentenced defendant, as a second felony offender, to life in prison without thepossibility of parole.
Defendant now appeals, contending initially that his convictions are against the weight [*2]of the evidence. This standard requires us to view the evidence in aneutral light and " ' "weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relativestrength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" ' " (People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633,643 [2006], quoting People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987] [citation omitted]).Also, " 'we accord great deference to the jury's conclusions regarding the credibility of witnessesand the weight to be given their testimony' " (People v Smith, 27 AD3d 894, 897 [2006], lv denied 6NY3d 898 [2006], quoting People v Newell, 290 AD2d 652, 654 [2002], lvdenied 98 NY2d 712 [2002]).
Here, in order to prove defendant guilty of the two counts of murder in the first degree, thePeople were required to show that he, with the intent to cause the death of another person, causedthe death of such person while committing attempted rape in the first degree and attemptedsexual abuse in the first degree (see Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii]). At trial, theeyewitnesses testified as to what they had seen, but were unable to positively identify defendantas the person they had observed. For their part, the officers described what they had observed andrelated statements made by defendant at the scene, which showed that he knew the gender of thevictim without being told, denied raping her without being questioned, admitted to having paidher for fellatio and acknowledged that he was "going away for life." The officer who interrogateddefendant at the police station testified that defendant asked him if the victim were dead and,after the officer said he did not think so, defendant said, "I murdered before. I told myself I wouldnever murder again." Forensic evidence showed that the victim had died as the result ofexceptionally violent, blunt-force trauma to her head and strangulation, that the blood found ondefendant was the victim's, and that DNA of both the victim and defendant were present inspecimens recovered from defendant's underwear and the victim's pubic area.
Testifying in his own defense, defendant offered an explanation for being at the scene andcovered with the victim's blood, saying that he had defended her against two unknown maleassailants and came in contact with her blood when he slipped and fell during the scuffle. He alsodenied making the oral statements related by the officers. Given the variety of evidenceconnecting defendant to the scene and the victim's murder, his alternate account of what hadoccurred presented credibility issues that the jury reasonably resolved against him (see People v Griffin, 26 AD3d594, 596 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 756 [2006]; People v Haight, 19 AD3d 714, 716 [2005], lv denied 5NY3d 806 [2005]). Thus, the finding that defendant was the victim's assailant is not against theweight of the evidence.
Next, defendant claims that he was shown to be unable to form the requisite criminal intentto cause the victim's death due to intoxication. " 'Whether an individual's level of intoxicationnegates the element of intent to commit a crime lies within the domain of the jury as the trier offact' " (People v Hazen, 20 AD3d586, 588 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 806 [2005], quoting People v Keller, 246AD2d 828, 829 [1998], lv denied 91 NY2d 1009 [1998]; see People v Clark, 241AD2d 710, 711 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 1010 [1997]). While defendant's appearanceat the crime scene and testimony at trial are some evidence of intoxication, other evidenceestablished that he was aware of his intentions and able to provide a detailed account of theevents following his arrest. Also, on cross-examination, defendant admitted being aware of whatwas happening at the park on the morning in question. Moreover, one of the arresting officersopined that if defendant were intoxicated, it did not seriously impair him. Under thesecircumstances, we cannot say that the jury improperly weighed the evidence in deciding in thePeople's favor the extent of defendant's intoxication (see People v Stewart, 296 AD2d587, 588 [2002]).[*3]
In addition, the eyewitness testimony describing therepeated punching of the victim, the forensic evidence as to the cause of the victim's death, andother evidence that defendant was a trained, successful professional boxer provided an amplebasis for the jury's conclusion that his conscious objective was to kill the victim (see People v Hawthorne, 35 AD3d499, 501-502 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 946 [2007]; People v Rivers, 17 AD3d 934,936 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 768 [2005]; People v Wallace, 217 AD2d 918,918-919 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 847 [1995]).
Also, the evidence supports the jury's conclusion that defendant killed the victim in thecourse and in furtherance of an attempted rape and attempted sexual abuse. The evidenceestablished that defendant had punched and restrained the victim into submission, that her pantswere completely ripped open, and that he had moved his body back and forth on top of her, as ifhaving sex. This, together with the presence of the victim's blood and his semen on hisunderwear, provided a basis for the jury to find that he had "engage[d] in conduct which tend[ed]to effect the commission" of rape and sexual abuse by the use of force (Penal Law §110.00; see Penal Law § 130.00 [8]; § 130.35 [1]; § 130.65 [1];People v Haims, 171 AD2d 878, 879 [1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 966 [1991];People v Simmons, 170 AD2d 15, 20-21 [1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 1130[1991]). Accordingly, "[d]efendant's intent to rape [and sexually assault the victim] couldreasonably be inferred by the jury from defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances"(People v Pereau, 99 AD2d 591, 592 [1984], affd 64 NY2d 1055 [1985]).
Defendant next contends that his oral statements to the arresting officers should have beensuppressed as the product of custodial interrogation before he was advised of his Mirandarights, and that his later oral and written statements should have been suppressed because, due tohis intoxication, he could not have voluntarily waived his rights. The record, however, supportsCounty Court's findings that defendant's initial statements were spontaneous and not the result of" ' "express questioning or its functional equivalent" ' " (People v Harris, 57 NY2d 335,342 [1982], cert denied 460 US 1047 [1983], quoting People v Stoesser, 53NY2d 648, 650 [1981]; see People vStarks, 37 AD3d 863, 864-865 [2007]). The voluntariness of defendant's laterstatements turns upon his intoxication and we note that "[o]nly when the degree of inebriationhas risen to the level of mania or to the level where the defendant is unable to comprehend themeaning of his or her words is the statement suppressible" (People v Williams, 40 AD3d 1364, 1365 [2007], lv denied9 NY3d 927 [2007]; see People v Dobranski, 112 AD2d 541, 541 [1985], lvdenied 66 NY2d 614 [1985]). At the Huntley hearing, the police officers testifiedthat despite some signs of intoxication, defendant never appeared confused, disoriented or unsureabout what was occurring. Also, defendant did not testify at the hearing, and it is well settled thattestimony which is subsequently elicited at trial cannot be considered in reviewing a suppressionruling (see People v Wilkins, 65 NY2d 172, 180 [1985]; People v Rosa, 30 AD3d 905, 907[2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 851 [2006]). Deferring to County Court's credibilityassessments (see People v Davis, 18AD3d 1016, 1017 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 805 [2005]), we find that the recordsupports the court's conclusion that defendant's statements were voluntary.
Defendant also challenges County Court's ruling permitting the People to inquire oncross-examination about statements he made to a newspaper reporter denying involvement in aprior hit-and-run automobile accident that severely injured a four-year-old boy. "The decisionwhether to allow disclosure of prior criminal, vicious or immoral acts for the purpose ofimpeachment and credibility must be balanced against the potential prejudice to defendant"(People v Williams, 256 AD2d 661, 662 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 981 [1999][citation omitted]). Since other, separately admitted evidence established that defendant hadpleaded [*4]guilty to leaving the scene of an accident as a resultof that incident in 1996, admission of his statements bore logically on his "truthfulness, honestyor desire to deliberately further his . . . self-interest at the expense of society"without revealing any new prejudicial information (People v Quiller, 298 AD2d 712, 713[2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 618 [2003]; see People v Rivera, 101 AD2d 981, 982[1984], affd 65 NY2d 661 [1985]). Thus, their admission was not error.
We also are unpersuaded by defendant's claim that County Court committed reversible errorin admitting his certified professional boxing records into evidence and allowing the People toquestion him about being a boxer. County Court found these records, which included 19 wins byknockout, relevant to whether defendant possessed the ability to kill a person with his fists, hisawareness of such lethal capacity and the intent inferable from repeatedly punching the59-year-old victim. Further, they tended to discredit defendant's account that while fending offthe victim's assailants, he repeatedly fell and they escaped apparently without injury. SinceCounty Court properly weighed the probative value of this evidence against its potentialprejudicial effect (see People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988]), we find no error.
Finally, we have considered defendant's remaining arguments, including the claim that hissentence is harsh and excessive, and find them to be without merit.
Cardona, P.J., Peters, Spain and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.