| People v Singh |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 00291 [47 AD3d 733] |
| January 15, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v TejpalSingh, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Nicoletta J.Caferri, and Ushir Pandit of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Aloise, J.),rendered December 14, 2004, convicting him of murder in the second degree, attempted murderin the second degree, assault in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree, and reckless endangerment in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
In order for a declaration against penal interest to be admissible at trial, the proponent mustestablish that (1) the declarant was unavailable as a witness at trial; (2) the declarant was awarethat the statement was adverse to his or her penal interest when made; (3) the declarant hadcompetent knowledge of the facts underlying the statement; and (4) "most important, supportingcircumstances independent of the statement itself must be present to attest to its trustworthinessand reliability" (People v Settles, 46 NY2d 154, 167 [1978]; see People v Linyear, 25 AD3d811 [2006]).
Here, the Supreme Court properly precluded the out-of-court statements of four witnesses,finding that the statements did not qualify for admission as declarations against penal interestbecause the defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that the declarants knew that theirstatements were, in fact, against their penal interests (see People v Carter, 276 AD2d 347[2000]; People [*2]v Raife, 250 AD2d 864 [1998]). Thestatements, which were largely exculpatory and made under circumstances which suggest thatthey were intended to minimize each declarant's criminal involvement, were not clearly opposedto each declarant's penal interest (seePeople v Martin, 8 AD3d 883 [2004]; People v Raife, 250 AD2d 864 [1998]).
The defendant's contention that the prosecutor abused her discretion by denying immunity toa defense witness is without merit (see CPL 50.30; People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22,32 [1986]; People v Williams, 169 AD2d 798 [1991]). Santucci, J.P., Lifson, Covelloand Dickerson, JJ., concur.