| Pavel Yutsis Physician, P.C. v Staten Is. Univ. Hosp. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 00469 [47 AD3d 781] |
| January 22, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Pavel Yutsis Physician, P.C., et al., Respondents, v StatenIsland University Hospital et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Wolfson & Carroll, New York, N.Y. (Michael G. Wolfson, John W. Carroll, and Corey M.Shapiro of counsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendants appeal from (1) anorder of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Harkavy, J.) dated December 4, 2006, which grantedthe plaintiffs' post-verdict motion "for a hearing to determine the amount due to plaintiffs fromdefendants under [the parties' contract] for the period January 1, 2002 through February 20,2002" to the extent of directing the entry of judgment in the principal sum of $441,697.12 infavor of the plaintiffs and against them, and (2) a judgment of the same court dated January 20,2007, which, upon the order, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against them in the principal sum of$441,697.12.
Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the plaintiffs' post-verdict motion isdenied, the complaint is dismissed, and the order is modified accordingly; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants.
The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appealtherefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for reviewand have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).[*2]
In April 1999 the plaintiffs entered into a "clinic services"agreement with the defendants to provide administrative and professional services to six healthcare clinics operated by the defendants in Brooklyn and the Bronx. Based upon what theybelieved were improper billing and business practices, the defendants issued a letter datedFebruary 20, 2002 to the plaintiffs which terminated the agreement.
The amended complaint alleged that the defendants breached their contract with the plaintiffsby failing to pay the sum of $290,000 relating to services the plaintiffs performed in January2002 and by failing to pay the sum of $250,000 relating to services the plaintiffs performedbetween February 1, 2002 and February 20, 2002. In pre-trial proceedings, the Supreme Courtdismissed the plaintiffs' equitable claims and directed a jury trial. The jury ultimately rendered itsverdict in favor of the defendants after the conclusion of the "liability phase" of the bifurcatedtrial, finding that it was the plaintiffs that had breached the agreement, not the defendants.
The plaintiffs then made a post-verdict motion in which they requested "a hearing todetermine the amount due to plaintiffs from defendants under [the parties' contract] for the periodJanuary 1, 2002 through February 20, 2002." For reasons not clear on this record, this portion ofthe breach of contract cause of action was not submitted to the jury for its consideration. Inresponse to this post-verdict motion, the Supreme Court, in an order dated May 3, 2006, in effect,required the defendants to produce certain evidence that had not been adduced at trial anddirected the defendants to furnish a "final reconciliation" which had been mentioned in theplaintiffs' February 20, 2002 termination letter. The defendants, over objection, complied andproduced voluminous records. Based on these post-verdict submissions, on December 4, 2006,the trial court issued an order finding the plaintiffs entitled to judgment in their favor in theprincipal sum of $441,697.12. Judgment was entered in that amount and the defendants appeal.We reverse.
Reversal is required on the ground that the Supreme Court had no authority, after the jurytrial had concluded with a verdict in favor of the defendants, to compel the defendants to produceadditional evidence and then, based on such evidence, issue a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.The CPLR does not authorize this procedural course of action.
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Spolzino, Carni andMcCarthy, JJ., concur.