| Puntarich v County of Suffolk |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 00474 [47 AD3d 785] |
| January 22, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Jason E. Puntarich, Respondent, v County of Suffolk et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Asher & Associates, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Stacy N. Baden of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Tanenbaum, J.), dated July 24, 2006, which denied theirmotion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The manner in which a police officer operates his or her vehicle in an emergency situationmay not form the basis for civil liability to an injured third party unless the officer acted inreckless disregard for the safety of others (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 [a],[b], [e]; Shephard v City of NewYork, 39 AD3d 842 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 816 [2007]; DeLuca v Blanco, 31 AD3d 600,601 [2006]; Badalamenti v City of NewYork, 30 AD3d 452 [2006]). "The 'reckless disregard' standard requires proof that theofficer intentionally committed an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known orobvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow"(Badalamenti v City of New York, 30 AD3d at 453; see Saarinen v Kerr, 84NY2d 494, 501 [1994]). This standard requires a showing of more than a momentary lapse injudgment (see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]; Saarinen v Kerr, 84NY2d at 502; Salzano v Korba, 296 AD2d 393, 394 [2002]).
Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of lawby demonstrating that the police officer operating the vehicle which struck the plaintiff was [*2]engaged in an emergency operation at the time of the collision(see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 114-b), and that the officer's conduct did not rise tothe level of reckless disregard for the safety of others (see Salzano v Korba, 296 AD2d at395; Naue v Higgins, 242 AD2d 567, 568 [1997]; cf. Badalamenti v City of NewYork, 30 AD3d at 453; Gordon v County of Nassau, 261 AD2d 359 [1999]). Inopposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see generally Alvarez v ProspectHosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted thedefendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Santucci, J.P., Lifson,Covello and McCarthy, JJ., concur.