| Annabi v City Council of City of Yonkers |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 00635 [47 AD3d 856] |
| January 29, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Sandy Annabi et al., Respondents, v City Council of theCity of Yonkers et al., Appellants. (Action No. 1.) County of Westchester, Respondent, v City ofYonkers et al., Appellants. (Action No. 2.) |
—[*1] Smith, Buss & Jacobs, LLP, Yonkers, N.Y. (Jeffrey D. Buss of counsel), and John M.Murtagh, Yonkers, N.Y., for respondents in Action No. 1 (one brief filed).
In two related actions, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that General Ordinance No.12-2005 of the City of Yonkers is invalid, the defendants in both actions, City Council of theCity of Yonkers, City Clerk of the City of Yonkers, City of Yonkers, and Philip Amicone, asmayor of the City of Yonkers, appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order andjudgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.), entered May 2,2006, as, upon converting their motions pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaints inboth actions into motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaints, in effect, deniedthose motions and granted that branch of the cross motion of the plaintiffs in action No. 1 whichwas for summary judgment declaring that General Ordinance No. 12-2005 of the City of Yonkersis invalid.
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
By letters dated August 11, 2004 and July 7, 2005, the Westchester County Planning Board(hereinafter the County Planning Board) advised the City Council of the City of Yonkers of its[*2]recommendation that a certain 81.4-acre mixed-use proposeddevelopment project should be modified or disapproved for various reasons including, but notlimited to, inadequate traffic measures, conflicts with the County's public policy concerninglarge-scale retail developments, and the lack of general suitability of the site to accommodate theproposed project. Under these circumstances the Code of the City of Yonkers § 43-167 (C)prohibited the City Council from acting contrary to such recommendations except by vote of amajority plus one.
Subsequently, on November 22, 2005, at a meeting of the City Council, and on the CityCouncil's own motion, an amendment to the Code of the City of Yonkers § 43-167 (C) wasadopted which eliminated the majority plus one requirement and substituted a simple majorityvote for approval of the project contrary to the County Planning Board's recommendations. Theamendment by its terms was effective immediately and was denominated General Ordinance No.12-2005.
The defendants in these related actions, City Council of the City of Yonkers, City Clerk ofthe City of Yonkers, City of Yonkers, and Philip Amicone, as mayor of the City of Yonkers,argue that the Supreme Court incorrectly found this general ordinance to be invalid on the groundthat such ordinance should have been referred to the County Planning Board for review pursuantto General Municipal Law § 239-m. We disagree.
General Municipal Law § 239-m essentially requires that all zoning actions andamendments affecting real property within 500 feet from the boundary of any city, village, town,or existing or proposed county or state park or road, be referred to the County Planning Board forreview. Contrary to the defendants' contention, there is no difficulty in determining whether thechallenged law is the type of enactment subject to review under General Municipal Law §239-m. By its very terms, the challenged law affects a change in the regulations applying to allreal property within the City of Yonkers, and necessarily includes that real property which issituated within 500 feet of the boundaries, areas, and roadways set forth in the statute. Hence,inasmuch as the general ordinance at issue falls squarely within General Municipal Law §239-m, the defendants' failure to refer it to the County Planning Board is a jurisdictional defectwhich renders its enactment invalid (see Matter of Burchetta v Town Bd. of Town ofCarmel, 167 AD2d 339, 340-341 [1990]; Matter of Old Dock Assoc. v Sullivan, 150AD2d 695, 697 [1989]; Matter of Asma v Curcione, 31 AD2d 883, 884 [1969]).
In view of the foregoing it is unnecessary to address the defendants' remaining contentions.Crane, J.P., Florio and Carni, JJ., concur.
Lifson, J. (dissenting and voting to reverse the order and judgment insofar as appealed fromand to declare that General Ordinance No. 12-2005 is valid with the following memorandum):The facts of this case are not in dispute. A development proposal known as "The Ridge HillProject," which would necessitate substantial change in the existing land use regulations on the81.4-acre property in question, was reviewed by the Westchester County Planning Board(hereinafter the County Planning Board). By letters dated August 11, 2004 and July 7, 2005, theCounty Planning Board recommended that the application for the project either be denied orsubstantially modified due to concerns about the ability of the various roads nearby toaccommodate the traffic that would be generated by the project.[*3]
On November 22, 2005 a majority of the City Council ofthe City of Yonkers (hereinafter the City Council), apparently desirous of approving the variousland use modifications necessitated by the development proposal (despite the adverserecommendation of the County Planning Board), yet constrained by existing local laws whichrequired that such approval could only be achieved by the vote of a majority of the City Councilplus one (a super majority), attempted to amend the Code of the City of Yonkers § 43-167(C) (hereinafter the Zoning Code). The City Council, in essence, elected to opt out of therequirement for such a super majority by deleting such requirement from section 43-167 (C) ofthe Zoning Code. There is no dispute that no public hearing for this amendment took place, norwas the prior approval of the County Planning Board obtained or sought. The amendment to theZoning Code, known as General Ordinance No. 12-2005, was approved by a simple majority, towit, 4-3.
Two separate actions were brought, each seeking, inter alia, to declare the amendment to theZoning Code invalid. These actions were, in effect, joined for trial. The defendants moved todismiss both actions and the plaintiffs in action No. 1 (hereinafter the plaintiffs) cross-moved forsummary judgment declaring that General Ordinance No. 12-2005 is invalid. The Supreme Courtdenied the defendants' motions and granted the cross motion. This appeal ensued.
The two issues before us are: (1) whether the City Council had the power to act in the fashionthat it did in changing the Zoning Code to opt out of the super majority requirement on mattersreviewed by the County Planning Board, and (2) whether the City Council could do so in amanner that permitted only limited public input in the process. On both counts I regrettably mustdisagree with my colleagues in the majority.
Since a strong presumption of validity attaches to the enactment of legislation, a challengerhas the burden of proving its invalidity (see McMinn v Town of Oyster Bay, 66 NY2d544, 549 [1985]; Matter of Smith vTown of Plattekill, 13 AD3d 695 [2004]). For the reasons set forth below the plaintiffsfailed to sustain that burden.
I concede that the cases requiring review by the County Planning Board prior to effecting abona fide change in the land use regulations that may attach to a given property are legion. Theproblem is that in each case cited by the majority, and indeed in all such cases, the change atissue was substantive, i.e., it had a direct and an immediate bearing upon the use of the land inquestion. The change at issue here is merely procedural and does not require both review by theCounty Planning Board and the invocation of a super majority to override that recommendationby the County Planning Board.
Initially, General Municipal Law § 239-m (3) (a) (ii) provides broadly for mandatoryreferral to a county planning board of proposed amendments to any provision of a local zoningcode. However, the very next clause restricts that requirement only to instances where the actionaffects real property within 500 feet of certain enumerated public boundaries or roadways orimprovements of a regional nature (see General Municipal Law § 239-m [3] [b]).Since the subject amendment is procedural it has no substantive effect as envisioned by theabove-cited sections of the General Municipal Law and such restrictions simply do not apply.
Even if that were not the case, this Court on several occasions has held that the strictures ofthese provisions of the General Municipal Law are not to be applied where, as here, they aresuperseded by the Westchester County Administrative Code (see 208 E. 30th St. Corp. vTown of [*4]N. Salem, 88 AD2d 281 [1982]; Bloom vTown Bd. of Town of Yorktown, 80 AD2d 823 [1981]). Section 277.61 (1) of theWestchester County Administrative Code specifies that it only applies to certain amendments ofa municipality's zoning code and then goes on to limit its power of review to certain instances (alldealing with the change of use of specific property) (see Westchester CountyAdministrative Code § 277.61 [2]). Nothing in that section requires referral to the CountyPlanning Board for changes in procedure as further indicated by the information set forth on theCounty's website. Nor does section 43-165 of the Zoning Code require a referral to the CountyPlanning Board since that section only requires such referral where it is required by GeneralMunicipal Law § 239-m or the Westchester County Administrative Code. As set forthabove, neither of these two laws so require this referral of a procedural matter for its review.Therefore, it would appear that there was no requirement that the subject amendment to theZoning Code be reviewed by the County Planning Board.
Similarly, there was no requirement that a hearing was mandatory prior to the City Council'sadoption of the amendment to the procedure to be used in voting on applications for modificationof the controlling land use regulations. In granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, theSupreme Court relied on the provisions of General City Law § 83 which mandate suchhearings. However, once again such requirement for a hearing was subject to those instancesspecified in General City Law § 20 (24) and (25), both of which concern specific land useregulations dealing with lot size, building heights, etc., but not with the voting procedure or otherrequirements of a procedural nature.
Moreover, the record is clear that the proposed amendment to eliminate the super majorityrequirement (which would place the City of Yonkers in conformity with most, if not all, thelocalities in Westchester County) was placed on the agenda for November 22, 2005 (a regularlyscheduled meeting date of the City Council) at the prior regularly scheduled meeting of the CityCouncil one week earlier. The record shows that the intentions of the City Council were wellpublicized. In fact, the plaintiffs concede that on the date the matter came to be considered, over500 people—the largest number to appear before a City Council meeting—werepresent to oppose the adoption of the amendment. Thus, there was hardly a lack of adequatenotice and one could argue that this circumstance alone was sufficient to comply with the allegedpublic hearing requirement urged by the plaintiffs.
The foregoing begs the question of whether a public hearing was required prior to the CityCouncil's consideration of the proposed amendment. The record contains an affidavit of theCorporation Counsel for the City of Yonkers who asserts that the amendment was properlyhandled by the City Council on November 22, 2005. Where, as here, there is an electedexecutive, there is no requirement for a public hearing prior to the City Council's enactment of ageneral ordinance. It appears that the City Council fully complied with the requirements of bothGeneral City Law § 20 (4) and (5) and Second Class Cities Law § 35. The proprietyof the mayor's execution of the ordinance in accordance with General City Law § 20 (5)and Second Class Cities Law § 38 was not addressed below or argued by either party onthis appeal and therefore need not be addressed.
For the foregoing reasons, to the extent a justiciable controversy still exists, I believe that thedefendants are entitled to a judgment declaring that the City Council properly voted on thenullification of the super majority requirement previously imposed by the Zoning Code. Itherefore, respectfully dissent.