Alden State Bank v Sunrise Bldrs., Inc.
2008 NY Slip Op 00898 [48 AD3d 1162]
February 1, 2008
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 16, 2008


Alden State Bank, Respondent, v Sunrise Builders, Inc., et al.,Defendants, and Joseph D. Parker et al., Appellants. (Appeal No. 2.)

—[*1]James A. Partacz, West Seneca, for defendants-appellants.

Hurwitz & Fine, P.C., Buffalo (Timothy P. Johnson of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (John A. Michalek, J.), enteredFebruary 9, 2007. The order, insofar as appealed from, upon reargument, adhered to the court'sprior decision in appeal No. 1.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law bydenying those parts of the motion for partial summary judgment against defendants Joseph D.Parker and Natalie T. Parker seeking determination of the priority of plaintiff's mortgage lien anddismissal of the affirmative defense of those defendants of unclean hands and vacating thatdetermination and reinstating that affirmative defense and as modified the order is affirmedwithout costs.

Memorandum: Alden State Bank (Alden) commenced an action against, inter alia,defendants Joseph D. Parker and Natalie T. Parker seeking to foreclose on its mortgage onproperty owned by the Parkers. The Parkers had purchased the property pursuant to a buildingcontract that required them to make progress payments during the construction of a single-familyhome, with the balance of the contract payable upon the delivery of the deed. Pursuant to asubordination clause in the building contract, "all terms and provisions of this Contract are andshall be subject and subordinate to the lien of any building loan mortgage heretofore or hereaftermade."

After the Parkers made some progress payments to the contractor, the contractor obtained abuilding loan from Alden in the amount of $125,000 that was secured by a duly recordedmortgage on the property. The loan was on an Alden form titled "Building Loan Contract" and,under the terms of the loan, Alden was to advance installments to the contractor upon itscompletion of specific work items. For reasons not disclosed in the record, Alden advanced theentire loan amount to the contractor, although the contractor abandoned the project withoutcompleting the work items specified in the "Building Loan Contract." After abandoning theproject, the contractor transferred title to the property to the Parkers, and they completedconstruction of the home at their own expense. The contractor failed to make any payments on[*2]the Alden loan, and Alden commenced the action against,inter alia, the Parkers. Supreme Court granted the motion of Alden for partial summary judgmentseeking determination of the priority of its mortgage lien over the interests of the Parkers, subjectonly to their vendee's lien, and seeking dismissal of all of the affirmative defenses andcounterclaims of the Parkers above their vendee's lien claim. By the order in appeal No. 2, thecourt granted that part of the motion of the Parkers for leave to reargue their opposition toAlden's motion and, upon reargument, adhered to its prior decision. The Parkers subsequentlycommenced an action against, inter alia, Alden and, by the order in appeal No. 3, the courtgranted the motion of Alden to dismiss the complaint against it on the ground that the issuesraised by the Parkers had already been determined in favor of Alden. We note at the outset thatthe Parkers did not raise any issue with respect to the order in appeal No. 3 and thus are deemedto have abandoned any issue concerning that order (see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202AD2d 984 [1994]).

Contrary to the contention of the Parkers, Alden is entitled to enforce the subordinationclause of the building contract with the contractor based on its status as a third-party beneficiaryof that subordination clause (seegenerally DeLine v CitiCapital Commercial Corp., 24 AD3d 1309, 1311 [2005], lvdenied 27 AD3d 1203 [2006]), and the terms of the subordination clause are not vague orambiguous (cf. Pawling Sav. Bank v Hunt Props., 225 AD2d 678, 679 [1996], lvdismissed 89 NY2d 917, 91 NY2d 866 [1996]; Finest Invs. v Security Trust Co. ofRochester, 96 AD2d 227, 229 [1983], affd 61 NY2d 897 [1984]). Moreover, thecontractor's actions did not nullify the building contract because, upon the contractor's breach, theParkers did not repudiate the contract but instead elected to continue to treat it as valid, asdemonstrated by their acceptance of the title to the property after the contractor's breach (seeTibbetts Contr. Corp. v O & E Contr. Co., 15 NY2d 324, 338 [1965]; Inter-Power ofN.Y. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 259 AD2d 932, 934 [1999], lv denied 93NY2d 812 [1999]).

We agree with the Parkers, however, that Alden failed to meet its initial burden on that partof its motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the priority of Alden's mortgage lien,and we therefore modify the order in appeal No. 2 accordingly. Although Alden concedes that theParkers have a valid vendee's lien that in the usual case would have priority over Alden'smortgage lien, Alden contends that its mortgage lien has priority over the vendee's lien in thiscase based on the subordination clause in the building contract. In order for a mortgage to qualifyas a building loan mortgage within the meaning of the subordination clause, the underlying loanmust be made in compliance with a building loan agreement (see Pawling Sav. Bank, 225AD2d at 679; see also Juszak v Lily & Don Holding Corp., 224 AD2d 588, 588-589[1996]). "A building loan agreement is . . . an agreement to provide 'a loan for thepurpose of erecting a building and to be advanced in installments from time to time as might berendered safe by the condition of the building' " (Finest Invs., 96 AD2d at 229, quotingWeaver Hardware Co. v Solomovitz, 235 NY 321, 333-334 [1923], rearg denied236 NY 591 [1923]; see Pawling Sav. Bank, 225 AD2d at 679; Juszak, 224AD2d at 588-589). Thus, in order to establish that its mortgage lien has priority over the vendee'slien held by the Parkers based on the subordination clause, Alden was required to establish thatthere was a building loan agreement and that Alden advanced money to the contractor incompliance with the terms of that agreement (see generally Pawling Sav. Bank, 225AD2d at 679). Alden failed to meet that burden, however (see generally Zuckerman v City ofNew York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]) and, indeed, the record establishes that Alden violatedthe "Building Loan Contract" by making payments for work not yet performed by the contractor.

We further agree with the Parkers that Alden failed to meet its initial burden with respect tothat part of its motion seeking dismissal of the Parkers' affirmative defense of unclean hands(see generally id.), and we therefore further modify the order in appeal No. 2 accordingly.Alden failed to submit any evidence establishing the basis for its agreement to lend the contractora sum that would result in negative equity in the home or any evidence establishing why itadvanced the [*3]entire loan amount to the contractor despite thecontractor's failure to complete all of the work items specified in the "Building Loan Contract"(see generally id.).

The Parkers' remaining contentions with respect to appeal No. 2 are raised for the first timeon appeal and thus are not properly before us (see Ciesinski, 202 AD2d at 985).Present—Gorski, J.P., Martoche, Lunn, Fahey and Pine, JJ.


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