| Matter of Chaplin v New York City Dept. of Educ. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01012 [48 AD3d 226] |
| February 5, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Marilyn Chaplin, Appellant, v New YorkCity Department of Education, Respondent. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Alan G. Krams of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol R. Edmead, J.), entered January 30,2006, which denied the petition brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking to annulrespondent's determination to terminate petitioner's employment as a New York Cityschoolteacher, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Petitioner's argument that the award should be vacated because the arbitrator failed toadjourn the penalty phase of the hearing (Education Law § 3020-a [4] [a]) until afterpetitioner's appeal has not been preserved (see Matter of Bevona [Alma Realty], 201AD2d 309 [1994]). Although petitioner sought and obtained stays of the arbitration proceeding inorder to permit the criminal trial to take place prior to the hearing, she failed to ask for a stay ofthe penalty phase pending appellate review of her criminal conviction. Indeed, in motion practicedisputing the preclusive effect of the guilty verdict in her disciplinary proceeding, petitionerargued that a penalty hearing to assess her fitness to teach was appropriate, and her request wasgranted.
In any event, there was no basis for vacating the award. A criminal defendant does not have aright to stay a related disciplinary proceeding pending the outcome of trial (Matter of Watson v City of Jamestown,27 AD3d 1183 [2006]), and a stay is not required for the protection of her constitutionalrights.
The penalty of termination was in accord with due process, supported by the record evidence,and is not shocking to our sense of fairness (see Matter of Smith v Board of Educ. ofWantagh Union Free School Dist., 259 AD2d 704 [1999]). Petitioner's misconductcompromised her ability to function in her job and constituted unacceptable behavior. Acts ofmoral turpitude committed in the course of public employment are an appropriate ground for[*2]termination of even long-standing employees with good workhistories (see Matter of Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32 [2001]). Concur—Tom, J.P.,Saxe, Gonzalez, Buckley and Catterson, JJ.