| Strong v Dubin |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01021 [48 AD3d 232] |
| February 5, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Leslie Elliot Strong, Respondent, v Madeline Dubin,Appellant. |
—[*1] Lee A. Rubenstein, New York City, for respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Laura E. Drager, J.), entered December 20, 2006,which, to the extent appealed from, confirmed a Referee's report finding the parties' prenuptialagreement valid and enforceable, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
A strong public policy favors individuals who order and decide their own interests throughcontractual arrangements, including prenuptial agreements (Matter of Greiff, 92 NY2d341, 344 [1998]). Indeed, a duly executed prenuptial agreement, which is deliberately preparedand executed to reflect the intention of the parties, is accorded the same presumption of legalityas any other contract (Bloomfield v Bloomfield, 97 NY2d 188, 193 [2001]). Defendantcontends that she merely relied on plaintiff when executing the agreement, but there is noevidence of undue influence. Nor are there exceptional circumstances that would warrant ashifting of the burden of proof.
The fact that plaintiff's counsel recommended an attorney for defendant after she said she didnot have one, and that this attorney had once worked in plaintiff's counsel's office as an internduring college, neither evinces undue influence nor demonstrates a conflict of interest on the partof defendant's counsel. Defendant was not required to use the referred attorney, nor was shepressured to do so. She admittedly had other legal resources to whom she could have turned, ifonly for an independent referral. Moreover, it is uncontested that defendant asked counsel noquestions about the agreement. When counsel told defendant that the agreement appearedone-sided, she purportedly responded: "It's okay. I just want to get married." We find no reason todisturb the Referee's and the court's determination to credit counsel's testimony. Defendantadmitted that she read the agreement before signing it, and while she did not understand the"legalese" (i.e., statutory references), she did understand that the parties' properties would remainseparate. When asked if she understood the waiver of maintenance prior to signing theagreement, she answered, "I'm sure I did."
A failure to disclose financial matters, by itself, is not sufficient to vitiate a prenuptialagreement (see Panossian v Panossian, 172 AD2d 811 [1991]). There was no attempt byplaintiff to conceal or misrepresent the nature or extent of his [*2]assets. In fact, defendant was personally acquainted with theseassets. We also find nothing unconscionable about the agreement. Concur—Tom, J.P.,Saxe, Gonzalez, Buckley and Catterson, JJ.