| McRedmond v Sutton Place Rest. & Bar, Inc. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01086 [48 AD3d 258] |
| February 7, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Kristen McRedmond et al., Respondents, v Sutton PlaceRestaurant and Bar, Inc., et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Tacopina & Arnold, LLC, New York City (Joseph Tacopina of counsel), forrespondents.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Debra A. James, J.), entered June 4, 2007, insofaras it granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendants' first, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventhcounterclaims, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is to be afforded aliberal construction. "We accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs thebenefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fitwithin any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).
As to the first counterclaim, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distressmust be supported by allegations of conduct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme indegree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, andutterly intolerable in a civilized community" (Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp.,58 NY2d 293, 303 [1983], quoting Restatement [Second] of Torts § 46, Commentd). "Such extreme and outrageous conduct must be clearly alleged in order for thecomplaint to survive a motion to dismiss" (Sheila C. v Povich, 11 AD3d 120, 131 [2004]). Defendants failedto specify sufficiently the conduct alleged to be "outrageous." Furthermore, the conductcomplained of—making statements to news media about this litigation—falls farshort of the standard required to sustain such a claim.
With regard to counterclaims four through seven, CPLR 3016 (a) requires, in actions for libelor slander, that the particular words complained of be set forth in the complaint. A counterclaimfor defamation satisfies this requirement where a copy of the allegedly libelous statement isattached to the answer and is expressly incorporated in the counterclaim (see David J. CoganMgt. Co. v Lipset, 79 AD2d 918 [1981]), as is the case here.
The allegedly defamatory statements appeared in various news articles and Web sites relatingto this litigation. Since the statements complained about, with one exception noted below,essentially summarize or restate the allegations of the complaint herein, they are protected byCivil Rights Law § 74, which provides in pertinent part that "A civil action cannot bemaintained against any person, firm or corporation, for the publication of a fair and true report of[*2]any judicial proceeding." To be "fair and true," the accountneed only be "substantially accurate" (Holy Spirit Assn. for Unification of World Christianityv New York Times Co., 49 NY2d 63, 67 [1979]).
The statement to the New York Post, in which plaintiff McRedmond allegedly said defendantKassis would often make anti-Jewish remarks in the restaurant, is entirely unrelated to thislitigation and cannot be found in the complaint. Therefore, it is not afforded the protections ofCivil Rights Law § 74. However, since defendants failed to allege special damages, andthe statement in question does not constitute defamation per se, this sixth counterclaim cannot besustained (see Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429, 434-435 [1992]).Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Saxe, Friedman, Catterson and Acosta, JJ. [See 2007NY Slip Op 31435(U).]