| Matter of Hattie G. v Monroe County Dept. of Social Servs., Children'sServs. Unit |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01242 [48 AD3d 1292] |
| February 8, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Hattie G., Petitioner, v Monroe County Departmentof Social Services, Children's Services Unit et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Arnold of counsel), forrespondents New York State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment, Valerie R.Johnson, Administrative Law Judge and Richard E. Davidson.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of theSupreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, MonroeCounty [Thomas A. Stander, J.], entered May 17, 2007) to review a determination of respondentRichard E. Davidson, as designee of the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Childrenand Family Services. The determination found after a hearing that petitioner committed an act ofchild maltreatment.
It is hereby ordered that the determination is unanimously annulled on the law without costs,the petition is granted and the matter is remitted to respondent Richard E. Davidson, as designeeof the Commissioner of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services, forcompliance with Social Services Law § 424-a (2) (d) and (e).
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul thedetermination denying her request to amend an indicated report of child maltreatment maintainedat respondent New York State Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (CentralRegister) by noting that respondent Monroe County Department of Social Services (DSS) failedto sustain its burden at the fair hearing of establishing that petitioner committed an act ofmaltreatment (see Social Services Law § 424-a [2] [d]), thereby precluding theCentral Register from disseminating to appropriate providers and licensing agencies theinformation that petitioner is the subject of an indicated child abuse and maltreatment report(see § 424-a [2] [d], [e]). We agree with petitioner that the determination that shecommitted the act of maltreatment alleged in the indicated report is not supported by substantialevidence and that it therefore must be annulled.
After discovering that her 14-year-old daughter stayed out overnight without permission,petitioner confronted her with a plastic toy wiffle bat, struck her several times in the legs and[*2]buttocks, and then accidentally struck her once in the head.The inadvertent blow produced a small welt or bruise under her daughter's right eye. Schoolauthorities notified the Central Register of the daughter's injury, and a DSS caseworkerseparately interviewed the daughter, another daughter who witnessed the incident, and petitioner.All three individuals gave the caseworker similar accounts of the incident, and both daughtersconfirmed that petitioner rarely, if ever, employed corporal punishment. Following the incident,the daughter in question resided with her father for several days and then returned to petitioner'shouse without further incident.
The indicated report concluded that the daughter was "maltreated/abused" and that theallegations of excessive corporal punishment, inadequate guardianship, and lacerations, bruises,and welts were "[s]ubstantiated." Following a fair hearing, Richard E. Davidson, as designee ofthe Commissioner of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (respondentdesignee), determined that petitioner "failed to exercise the requisite degree of care under thecircumstances and that [her] failure caused [her daughter] to be physically impaired. . . prov[ing] . . . that [petitioner] committed the maltreatment allegedin the report."
We conclude on the record before us that the determination is not supported by substantialevidence, i.e., "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support aconclusion or ultimate fact" (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights,45 NY2d 176, 180 [1978]). "While hearsay, if sufficiently relevant and probative, may constitutesubstantial evidence sufficient to support the underlying determination . . . , theproof as a whole must be 'of such quality and quantity as to generate conviction in and persuade afair and detached fact finder that, from that proof as a premise, a conclusion or ultimate fact maybe extracted reasonably—probatively and logically' " (Matter of Burks v Wing, 242AD2d 624, 625 [1997]). At the fair hearing, DSS had the burden of establishing by a fairpreponderance of the evidence that petitioner maltreated her daughter by the use of excessivecorporal punishment (see Social Services Law § 424-a [2] [d]; see generallyMatter of Robert OO. v Dowling, 217 AD2d 785, 786 [1995], affd 87 NY2d 1043[1996]), and that such corporal punishment impaired or was in imminent danger of impairing herdaughter's physical, mental, or emotional condition (see Social Services Law § 412[2] [a] [i]; Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i]; Matter of Cheyenne F., 238 AD2d 905[1997]). "This prerequisite to a finding of [maltreatment based upon] neglect ensures that the[agency] . . . will focus on serious harm or potential harm to the child, not just onwhat might be deemed undesirable parental behavior" (Nicholson v Scoppetta, 3 NY3d 357, 369 [2004]). Impairment of aphysical condition has been defined as " 'a state of substantially diminished physical growth,freedom from disease, and physical functioning in relation to, but not limited to, fine and grossmotor development and organic brain development' " (Matter of Nassau County Dept. ofSocial Servs. v Denise J., 87 NY2d 73, 78, quoting Besharov, Practice Commentary,McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 1012, at 321 [1999 ed]).
At the fair hearing, the only witness to testify on behalf of DSS was the DSS caseworker whoconducted the three interviews. He testified that his conclusion that petitioner had engaged inexcessive corporal punishment was based on the fact that she had used physical punishment andcaused the mark or bruising below her daughter's eye. There was no evidence presented at thehearing indicating that the daughter received medical treatment for her eye or another condition,or that petitioner had used corporal punishment on any other occasion. The testimony ofpetitioner that her daughter, who was 17 years old at the time of the hearing, was living with her,doing well and intending to graduate from high school was uncontroverted. We therefore annulthe determination, grant the petition and remit the matter to respondent designee for compliancewith Social Services Law § 424-a (2) (d) and (e). Present—Scudder, P.J., Gorski,Lunn, Fahey and Peradotto, JJ.