Gjoni v 108 Rego Devs. Corp.
2008 NY Slip Op 01301 [48 AD3d 514]
February 13, 2008
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 16, 2008


Johny Gjoni et al., Appellants,
v
108 Rego DevelopersCorp. et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[*1]Leav & Steinberg, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Elizabeth Mark Meyerson and Daniel T. Leavof counsel), for appellants.

McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler, LLP, Carle Place, N.Y. (Patrick M. Murphy andMichael Smar of counsel), for respondent 108 Rego Developers Corp.

Milber, Makris, Plousadis & Seiden, LLP, Woodbury, N.Y. (Lorin A. Donnelly and David S.Taylor of counsel), for respondent Shan-E-Panjab, Inc., doing business as Dunkin'Donuts.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited bytheir brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kitzes, J.), datedOctober 16, 2006, as granted the separate motions of the defendant 108 Rego Developers Corp.and the defendant Shan-E-Panjab, Inc., doing business as Dunkin' Donuts, for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

The plaintiff Johny Gjoni allegedly slipped and fell on a patch of "black ice" on the sidewalkin front of premises owned by the defendant 108 Rego Developers Corp. and leased to thedefendant Shan-E-Panjab, Inc., doing business as Dunkin' Donuts (hereinafter the defendants).The plaintiffs subsequently commenced the present action, attempting to impose liability on thedefendants based upon their failure to maintain the subject sidewalk in reasonably safe condition,including the negligent removal and failure to remove snow and ice.

In opposition to the defendants' prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter[*2]of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320[1986]), the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants' snowremoval on the date of the accident created a more hazardous condition (see Joseph v Pitkin Carpet, Inc., 44AD3d 462 [2007]; Williams vKJAEL Corp., 40 AD3d 985 [2007]; Wu Zhou Wu v Korea Shuttle Express Corp., 23 AD3d 376[2005]). The plaintiffs also failed to establish that the alleged hazardous condition was visibleand apparent, and existed for a sufficient length of time before the accident for the defendants todiscover and remedy it (see Murphy v 136 N. Blvd. Assoc., 304 AD2d 540 [2003]). Theplaintiffs presented no evidence concerning the length of time the ice was on the ground beforethe fall or whether the defendants received prior complaints about the condition. Thus, theSupreme Court properly granted the defendants' separate motions for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them (see Murphy v 136 N. Blvd.Assoc., 304 AD2d 540 [2003]). Rivera, J.P., Ritter, Dillon and Carni, JJ., concur.


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