Noghrey v Town of Brookhaven
2008 NY Slip Op 01314 [48 AD3d 529]
February 13, 2008
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 16, 2008


Parviz Noghrey, Respondent-Appellant,
v
Town ofBrookhaven et al., Appellants-Respondents.

—[*1]Snitow Kanfer Holtzer & Millus, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Paul F. Millus and Virginia K.Turnkes of counsel), for appellants-respondents.

Gleich, Siegel & Farkas, Great Neck, N.Y. (Lawrence W. Farkas and Stephan B. Gleich ofcounsel), for respondent-appellant.

Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Albany, N.Y., and John D. Echeverria, Washington, D.C., pro hacvice, for amici curiae Association of Towns for the State of New York, the American PlanningAssociation, and New York Metro Chapter of the American Planning Association (one brieffiled).

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for a regulatory taking of property without justcompensation, the defendants appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County(Whelan, J.), entered April 28, 2006, which, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the plaintiff andagainst them in the principal sum of $1,647,000, and the plaintiff cross-appeals from the samejudgment.

Ordered that the cross appeal by the plaintiff is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and the matter is remitted to the SupremeCourt, Suffolk County, for a new trial on so much of the third, sixth, ninth, and twelfth causes ofaction of the amended complaint as asserted partial regulatory takings of property without justcompensation pursuant to 42 USC § 1983; and it further,

Ordered that the defendants are awarded one bill of costs.[*2]

The plaintiff's cross appeal from the judgment must bedismissed on the ground that he is not aggrieved thereby (see CPLR 5511). The issuesraised on the cross appeal have been considered in support of the plaintiff's contention that thejudgment appealed from should be affirmed (see Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of Cityof N.Y., 60 NY2d 539 [1983]).

In 1985 the plaintiff purchased two parcels of real property on Middle Country Road in theTown of Brookhaven, with the intention of building shopping plazas. At the time of thepurchases, the properties were zoned J-2 Business, which permits the construction of shoppingplazas. In 1987 the Town enacted a moratorium on new commercial development in certain areaswhile it reviewed and updated the Town's master plan. After the review, the Town changed thezoning on numerous parcels, including those owned by the plaintiff, from J-2 business to B-1residence. The rezoning was effective February 14, 1989.

The plaintiff then commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that the rezoning effectuated anunconstitutional taking of his property in violation of both the state and federal constitutions.After many years of motion practice and appeals in both state and federal courts (see Noghrey v Town of Brookhaven,21 AD3d 1016 [2005]), the matter went to trial in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County,on the takings causes of action. After trial, the jury found that the plaintiff had not established atotal regulatory taking under federal law pursuant to Lucas v South Carolina CoastalCouncil (505 US 1003 [1992]), nor any of his state law claims. The jury found, however,that the plaintiff had established a partial regulatory taking under federal law pursuant to thebalancing of factors test articulated in Penn Central Transp. Co. v New York City (438US 104 [1978]). The Town appeals and we reverse and remit the matter to the Supreme Court,Suffolk County, for a new trial on that contention.

Errors in the jury charge necessitate reversal. When charging the jury regarding the federalpartial regulatory takings under Penn Central Transp. Co. v New York City (438 US 104[1978]), the court instructed the jury:

"With respect to the first factor; that is, the economic impact of the regulation, [the plaintiff]claims that the values of his properties were reduced substantially. You may consider the valuesof the properties immediately before and immediately after the rezoning, and whether or not thisreduction in value was a substantial reduction relative to the value before the propertieswere rezoned. [The plaintiff] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the rezoningdeprived him of any use permitted by the residential zoning classification and this resulted in. . . a near total or substantial decrease or significant reduction in value"(emphasis added).

This charge was insufficient to convey the proper standard by which to evaluate theeconomic impact of the rezoning for the purpose of determining whether, under federal law, therewas a taking.

While the United States Supreme Court has eschewed any set formula for determiningwhether a regulation constitutes a Penn Central taking (see Tahoe-Sierra PreservationCouncil, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 US 302, 326 [2002]; Palazzolo vRhode Island, 533 US 606, 617 [2001]), it has also indicated that such a taking requires adiminution in value which is "one step short of complete," citing as an example a 95%diminution in value (Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1019 n 8[1992]). The Court has further held that "a mere diminution in the value of property, howeverserious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking" (Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. vConstruction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 US 602, 645 [1993]). In makingthis statement, the Court cited [*3]cases in which a significantdiminution in value was insufficient to support a Penn Central taking (see Village ofEuclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365 [1926] [approximately 75% diminution in value];Hadacheck v Sebastian, 239 US 394 [1915] [92.5% diminution]). Lower federal courtshave likewise rejected Penn Central claims where the diminution in value caused by aregulation approached or exceeded 90% of the pre-regulation value (see Rith Energy, Inc. vU.S., 270 F3d 1347, 1352 [2001], cert denied 536 US 958 [2002]; Pompa Constr.Corp. v City of Saratoga Springs, 706 F2d 418, 425 [1983]; William C. Haas & Co., Inc.v City & County of San Francisco, Cal., 605 F2d 1117, 1120 [1979], cert denied 445US 928 [1980], reh denied 446 US 929 [1980]; cf. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v U.S.,28 F3d 1171 [1994] [Penn Central taking found for 99.5% loss]).

In an opinion adopted by the Federal Circuit, the Federal Court of Claims recently stated:"while courts have struggled with the dichotomy between compensable 'partial takings' andnoncompensable 'mere diminutions,' searching for a threshold beyond which diminution wouldbe indicative of a taking, several Supreme Court decisions suggest that diminutions in valueapproaching 85 to 90 percent do not necessarily dictate the existence of a taking. This courtlikewise has generally relied on diminutions well in excess of 85 percent before finding aregulatory taking" (Brace v United States, 72 Fed Cl 337, 357 [2006], affd on opbelow 250 Fed Appx 359 [Fed Cir 2007]).

The Supreme Court's charge in the instant case did not convey the applicable standard. Theterms "substantial" and "significant" were insufficient to convey the extent of diminutionnecessary to support a taking. Moreover, this error was exacerbated by other errors in the charge,including the inclusion of the "mere diminution" language in the portion of the charge related tototal regulatory takings under Lucas, instead of during its explanation of partial takingsunder Penn Central (see Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v ConstructionLaborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 US 602, 645 [1993]; Brace v UnitedStates, 72 Fed Cl 337, 357 [2006], affd on op below 250 Fed Appx 359 [Fed Cir2007]).

These errors were not harmless. Accordingly, the matter must be remitted to the SupremeCourt, Suffolk County, for a new trial on the plaintiff's partial regulatory taking claims assertedpursuant to 42 USC § 1983. Upon the retrial, the Supreme Court should instruct the jurythat the economic impact factor of the Penn Central analysis requires a loss in valuewhich is "one step short of complete" (Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US1003, 1019 n 8 [1992]). The court should make clear that "mere diminution in the value ofproperty, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking" (Concrete Pipe & Productsof Cal., Inc. v Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 US 602, 645[1993]), and that a land use restriction "is not rendered unconstitutional merely because it causesthe property's value to be 'substantially reduced' " (Putnam County Natl. Bank v City of New York, 37 AD3d 575, 577[2007], quoting de St. Aubin v Flacke, 68 NY2d 66, 77 [1986]). It should instruct thejury that the proper inquiry is whether the regulation left only a "bare residue" of value, or usesimilar language which would properly convey to the jury the high threshold of loss necessary tosupport a partial regulatory taking (de St. Aubin v Flacke, 68 NY2d 66, 77 [1986];see Brace v United States, 72 Fed Cl 337, 357 [2006], affd on op below 250 FedAppx 359 [Fed Cir 2007]; Pompa Constr. Corp. v City of Saratoga Springs, 706 F2d 418,425 [1983]; Matter of Friedenburg vNew York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 3 AD3d 86, 96-98 [2003]).

We note that, should the plaintiff prevail at the retrial, prejudgment interest on any federaltakings award should be determined by the "reasonably prudent investor" standard (seeSchneider [*4]v County of San Diego, 285 F3d 784, 793-794[2002]; United States v 50.50 Acres of Land, 931 F2d 1349, 1354 [1991]; see alsoMonongahela Nav. Co. v United States, 148 US 312, 327 [1893]; Schwimmer v AllstateIns. Co., 176 F3d 648, 650 [1999]).

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit (see Tatro v Kervin, 41 F3d 9,14 [1994]; W.J.F. Realty Corp. v Town of Southampton, 220 F Supp 2d 140, 149 [2002];Barry v Long Is. Univ., 8 AD3d519 [2004]). Spolzino, J.P., Skelos, Florio and Dickerson, JJ., concur.


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