| Matter of Maelee N. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01470 [48 AD3d 929] |
| February 21, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Maelee N., a Child Alleged to be Neglected.Broome County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Shannon O.,Appellant. |
—[*1] Kuredin V. Eytina, Broome County Department of Social Services, Binghamton, forrespondent. Michelle E. Stone, Law Guardian, Vestal.
Kane, J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Broome County (Connerton, J.),entered April 16, 2007, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to SocialServices Law § 384-b, to adjudicate respondent's child to be permanently neglected, andterminated respondent's parental rights.
Respondent's daughter (born in 2004) was placed in foster care when she was 10 days old. InAugust 2004, respondent admitted that she neglected the child. On January 17, 2006, petitionerfiled a petition seeking to terminate respondent's parental rights. Following fact-finding anddispositional hearings, Family Court concluded that respondent permanently neglected the child,terminated respondent's parental rights and freed the child for adoption. On respondent's appeal,we affirm.
The record supports Family Court's conclusion that respondent permanently neglected thechild. Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that it made diligent efforts to [*2]reunite the parent and child by providing, either directly or throughreferrals, parenting classes, anger management classes, nutrition classes, a parenting aide,transportation, an IQ test, a substance abuse evaluation, counseling, assistance to obtainemployment and weekly, three-hour supervised visits at respondent's home (see SocialServices Law § 384-b [7] [a]; Matter of Andrew Z., 41 AD3d 912, 912 [2007]). Respondent hasan average IQ and no identifiable substance abuse problem. She attended anger managementclasses, some counseling sessions, more than the required number of nutrition classes and tworounds of parenting classes. Despite her completion of all of these classes and weekly assistancefrom the parenting aide during visitation, respondent did not appear to adequately "benefit fromthe services offered and utilize the tools or lessons learned in those classes in order tosuccessfully plan for the child's future" (Matter of Elijah NN., 20 AD3d 728, 730 [2005]; see Matter of Willard L., 23 AD3d964, 966 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]). Respondent continued to havedifficulty with basic parenting tasks and supervision of the child, got angry when corrected anddid not maintain a suitable living environment or steady employment after more than two yearsof appropriate services offered by petitioner (see Matter of Jayde M., 36 AD3d 1168, 1170 [2007], lvdenied 8 NY3d 809 [2007]; Matterof Jeremiah BB., 11 AD3d 763, 765 [2004]). Giving deference to Family Court'scredibility assessments, petitioner proved that respondent failed to adequately plan for her child'sfuture (see Matter of Willard L., 23 AD3d at 966).
Family Court did not abuse its discretion by terminating respondent's parental rights ratherthan granting her a suspended judgment (see Family Ct Act § 631). A court shouldonly grant a parent a suspended judgment—one last chance to reunite with thechild—if that disposition is in the child's best interests; there is no presumption favoringthe return of the child to the parent at this point (see Matter of James X., 37 AD3d 1003, 1007 [2007]; Matter ofJayde M., 36 AD3d at 1170). In the 10 months between the fact-finding hearing and theconclusion of the dispositional hearing, respondent lived in four different locations, two of whichrespondent conceded were unsuitable even for visitation with the child. Respondent did not showany progress in her parenting abilities during that time. While respondent contends that hermarriage in August 2006 constitutes a stabilizing factor, in May 2006 she was engaged to adifferent man, not her current husband, who she then considered her emotional support. On theother hand, the child has bonded with her foster parents, who are willing to adopt her. Thus, therecord contains a sound and substantial basis for the court's determination to terminaterespondent's parental rights and free the child for adoption (see Matter of Jayde M., 36AD3d at 1170; Matter of Willard L., 23 AD3d at 966).
Cardona, P.J., Carpinello, Lahtinen and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order isaffirmed, without costs.