| Harris v Pathmark Stores, Inc. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01500 [48 AD3d 631] |
| February 19, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Jesse Harris, Respondent, v Pathmark Stores, Inc.,Appellant. |
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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals, as limited by itsbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Silverman, J.), datedJanuary 22, 2007, as granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to compel it torespond to items numbered 1 through 5, and item number 10 requested in the plaintiff's notice ofdiscovery and inspection dated December 14, 2006, and denied its cross motion for a protectiveorder.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and as a matter ofdiscretion, with costs, those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to compel thedefendant to respond to items numbered 1 through 5, and item number 10 requested in theplaintiff's notice of discovery and inspection dated December 14, 2006 are denied, and thedefendant's cross motion for a protective order is granted.
While CPLR 3101 (a) provides that "there shall be full disclosure of all matter material andnecessary in the prosecution . . . of an action" (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ.Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]), "unlimited disclosure is not permitted" (Silcox v City ofNew York, 233 AD2d 494, 494 [1996]).
In this case, the Supreme Court granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which wereto compel the defendant to respond to items numbered 1 through 5 and item number 10,requested in the notice of discovery and inspection dated December 14, 2006. However, in lightof the allegations contained in the plaintiff's bill of particulars, it is evident that these demandswere unduly burdensome, lacked specificity, and sought irrelevant and immaterial information,and therefore [*2]should have been stricken (see Lopez vHuntington Autohaus, 150 AD2d 351, 352 [1989]). Accordingly, those branches of theplaintiff's motion which were to compel the defendant to respond to items numbered 1 through 5and item number 10 should have been denied, and the defendant's cross motion for a protectiveorder should have been granted. Rivera, J.P., Lifson, Ritter and Carni, JJ., concur.