Matter of Harmon v Ivy Walk Inc.
2008 NY Slip Op 01632 [48 AD3d 344]
February 26, 2008
Appellate Division, First Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 16, 2008


In the Matter of James Harmon, Jr., et al.,Respondents,
v
Ivy Walk Incorporated et al., Appellants.

—[*1]Wrobel & Schatz, LLP, New York City (Philip R. Schatz of counsel), for appellants.

Carl J. Kubic, Flushing, for respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carol R. Edmead, J.), entered October 11, 2006,which, inter alia, granted petitioners' motion to permanently stay mediation and arbitration,unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion denied. Appeal from order, samecourt and Justice, entered December 29, 2006, which denied respondents' motion to renew andreargue, unanimously dismissed as taken from a nonappealable paper.

Petitioners entered into a contract with respondent Ivy Walk Incorporated (Ivy Walk) datedAugust 8, 2005 for interior renovations of the first floor of their private residence. The companywas originally incorporated under the name "Ivy Walk Construction Company, Inc." in August1997 and changed its name to "Ivy Walk, Inc." by certificate of amendment dated November 8,2004. On or about May 2, 2005, when Ivy Walk renewed its home improvement license with theNew York City Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA), it failed to inform the agency that it hadshortened and changed its name to Ivy Walk, Inc., although its address, ownership, telephone andtax identification numbers remained the same. A new home improvement license, under adifferent number, was issued by DCA to Ivy Walk, Inc. in or about September or October 2006,subsequent to the parties submitting their papers in connection with the underlying motion in thiscase.

The home improvement contract between the parties herein was an AIA Standard Form ofAgreement Between Owner and Contractor, which incorporated the AIA's general conditions ofthe contract for construction as well as instructions to bidders and addenda prepared bypetitioners' in-state architects. The instructions specified that one of the contractors was from outof state and specified the use of certain out-of-state components to be shipped to New York. Thecontract provided that New York law would govern. Section 4.6.1 of the general conditionsprovided that "Any Claim arising out of or related to the Contract . . . shall. . . be subject to arbitration" but that "Prior to arbitration, the parties shall endeavorto resolve disputes by mediation."

When petitioners' architect refused to certify payment application No. 6, Ivy Walk objectedand served a demand for arbitration with a request for preliminary mediation in July 2006.Petitioners challenged this demand on the ground that the caption stated the name "Ivy Walk[*2]Corporation" rather than the name on the contract, "Ivy WalkIncorporated."

Ivy Walk served an amended demand for arbitration, correcting the name to "Ivy WalkIncorporated." By letter dated July 27, 2006 to the American Arbitration Association (AAA),petitioners objected and claimed the demand was defective since Ivy Walk was incorporated as"Ivy Walk, Inc." rather than "Ivy Walk Incorporated," stating they would not participate in anarbitration because "Ivy Walk Incorporated" was "a non-existent corporation" to whichpetitioners had "no obligation of any kind," and that the corporation "lacks standing to make, fileor proceed with the Amended Demand." By letter dated August 1, 2006, AAA advised the partiesthat after careful review of the submissions in this case, it intended to proceed with thearbitration unless the parties agreed to a stay or a party obtained relief from a court.

Petitioners commenced this proceeding to permanently stay the mediation and arbitration,raising the same issue as its objection to arbitration. Petitioners also raised a claim that the AIAcontract was void because they could not find the entity "Ivy Walk Incorporated" in anyDepartment of Corporations or Department of Consumer Affairs database, and thus thecorporation did not exist and could not be a home improvement contractor pursuant to the HomeImprovement Business Law of the City of New York.

Respondents argued that Ivy Walk, Inc. was a duly filed and existing corporation, andpetitioners cited no cases to support the claimed distinction between using "Incorporated" or"Inc." Moreover, they stated that the company had obtained a license under its then existingname, Ivy Walk Construction Company, Inc., from the DCA to operate a home improvementbusiness, and that license was still valid. Finally, Ivy Walk contended that all issues of fact,including issues regarding incorporation or licenses, were to be determined by an arbitrator.

In reply, petitioners argued for the first time that the license was invalid because it was issuedto the corporation in its former name, and the failure to notify DCA of "any change or control inownership, management or business name or location" violated New York City AdministrativeCode § 20-393 (7), rendering the agreement to arbitrate between the parties void. The IAScourt accepted this argument and granted petitioners' motion to permanently stay mediation andarbitration.

Ivy Walk appealed and moved for reargument/renewal on the grounds that the court failed toconsider the application of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 USC § 1 et seq.) and Matter of Diamond Waterproofing Sys.,Inc. v 55 Liberty Owners Corp. (4 NY3d 247 [2005]). It also submitted additional factsto demonstrate that the project involved interstate commerce. The IAS court denied reargumentand made no separate ruling as to renewal.

The Home Improvement Business Law (Administrative Code of City of NY, tit 20, ch 2,subch 22) is a consumer protection statute whose intent was to safeguard and protect consumersagainst fraudulent practices and inferior work by persons and businesses claiming to be homeimprovement contractors (Administrative Code § 20-385; see B & F Bldg. Corp. vLiebig, 76 NY2d 689, 692 [1990]). The Administrative Code provides that those whoconduct home improvement contractor businesses must be licensed (§ 20-387 [a]) andstrict compliance with this licensing requirement is mandatory (Hanjo Contrs. v Wick,155 AD2d 304 [1989]).

Here, it is undisputed that Ivy Walk Construction Company, Inc. had a license issued byDCA. It is also undisputed that at all times, Ivy Walk, by whatever name it used, had the sameaddress, the same ownership, the same phone number and the same tax identification number.The issue, therefore, is whether Ivy Walk's failure to notify DCA of its name change, as requiredby section 20-393 (7), voided its license and, by extension, the contract. [*3]Initially, it is important to note that section 20-393 applies only tolicensed contractors. The court, by finding a violation of that section, acknowledged that IvyWalk was a licensed contractor. The Administrative Code treats violations by licensedcontractors (§ 20-392) differently from violations by unlicensed contractors (§20-401), and provides notice and due process requirements (§ 20-399) before impositionof a penalty against a licensee. Indeed, one such potential penalty is suspension of the contractor'slicense. The appropriate penalty to be imposed rests with the Commissioner. Only after a penaltyis imposed do the courts enter into the controversy, by way of judicial review (AdministrativeCode § 20-400).

Here, the court circumvented the procedures set forth in the Administrative Code regardingthe due process requirements applicable to Ivy Walk as a licensed contractor. Although itrecognized that "Ivy Walk, Inc." was merely a shorter name of the company under which thelicense was held, it found that such change, since it was not reported to DCA, mandated avoiding of the contract. However, it has long been held that "a corporation may be known byseveral names in the transaction of its business, and it may enforce and be bound by contractsentered into in an adopted name other than the regular name under which it was incorporated"(Mail & Express Co., Inc. v Parker Axles, Inc., 204 App Div 327, 329 [1923]). This isparticularly true where there is no confusion as to the parties involved in the contract (R.P.I. Servs., Inc. v Eisenberg, 29AD3d 459 [2006]). There is no issue here that the parties did not know whom they weredealing with, since Ivy Walk had the same principals, offices and contact information as those onfile with DCA. While it did not comply with the name change requirements of the AdministrativeCode, that issue should be addressed as set forth in the Administrative Code, not in the context ofan action to stay arbitration.

Accordingly, the parties are directed to proceed to arbitration pursuant to the terms of thecontract.

In view of the foregoing, it is not necessary to address respondent's arguments regarding theFederal Arbitration Act. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Buckley, Sweeny andMcGuire, JJ. [See 2006 NY Slip Op 30018(U).]


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