| Matter of Alexander James R. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01765 [48 AD3d 820] |
| February 26, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Alexander James R., Also Known as Alexander R.,Also Known as Alex R., Also Known as Alexander G. Administration for Children's Services etal., Respondents; Francine Mindy G., Also Known as Francine G., Also Known as Francine S.,Appellant, et al., Respondent. |
—[*1] Carrieri & Carrieri, P.C., Mineola, N.Y. (Ralph R. Carrieri of counsel), forpetitioner-respondent SCO Family of Services. Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Judith Stern of counsel), LawGuardian.
In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate the mother'sparental rights by reason of her mental illness, the mother appeals, as limited by her brief, fromso much of an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Queens County(Salinitro, J.), dated January 17, 2007, as, after a hearing, terminated her parental rights, andtransferred guardianship and custody of the child to the Commissioner of Social Services of theCity of New York and the St. Christopher-Ottilie Family of Services.
Ordered that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed insofar as appealed from,without costs or disbursements.
The petitioners established by clear and convincing evidence that the mother was unable toproperly and adequately care for her child, now and in the foreseeable future, by reason of mental[*2]illness (see Social Services Law § 384-b [3][g]; Matter of Mya Sherice B., 39 AD3d 744 [2007]; Matter of Tamaine WilliamB., 38 AD3d 767, 768 [2007]). The testimony of the agency's expert psychologist establishedthat the mother suffered from generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and borderlinepersonality disorder. In addition, she was dependent on anxiolytics and abused cocaine, whichprevented her from properly and adequately caring for the child. The mother's treatingpsychiatrist, who testified on her behalf, largely concurred with the agency's expert's diagnosisand could only state that given the right circumstances the mother "would have a chance" at"being an effective parent." However, the mere possibility that the mother might be capable ofproviding adequate care at some indefinite point in the future does not warrant denial of thepetition (see Matter of Dominique R., 38 AD3d 211 [2007]; Matter of Steven M.,37 AD3d 1072 [2007]; Matter of David Joseph G., 169 AD2d 439, 440 [1991]).Accordingly, the Family Court correctly concluded that the petitioners satisfied their burden ofproof (see Matter of Dederia S.C., 26 AD3d 375 [2006]; Matter of Danielle C., 6AD3d 530, 531 [2004]; Matter of Laura D., 270 AD2d 260, 261 [2000]).
Contrary to the mother's contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion indenying her request for an adjournment to call another expert witness in addition to her treatingpsychiatrist, since she had ample time to procure his attendance and, more importantly, there wasno showing that the witness's testimony would have been material and favorable to her (seeFamily Ct Act § 626 [a]; Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270, 283-284[1984]; Matter of Malik J., 13 AD3d 628, 629 [2004]; Matter of Truick v Truick,243 AD2d 572 [1997]).
Likewise, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to hold adispositional hearing (see Matter of Joyce T., 65 NY2d 39, 46-50 [1985]; Matter ofKaryn Katrina D., 19 AD3d 592, 593 [2005]; Matter of Julia P., 8 AD3d 389[2004]). Mastro, J.P., Florio, Miller and Dickerson, JJ., concur.