| Pinder v City of New York |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01861 [49 AD3d 280] |
| March 4, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Etelina Pinder, Appellant, v City of New York et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Sharyn Rootenberg of counsel),for respondents.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marilyn Shafer, J.), entered January 26, 2007,which, in this action to recover damages for violations of due process pursuant to 42 USC§ 1983 and for employment discrimination in violation of Executive Law § 296,granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff's cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is not viable inasmuch asplaintiff, a nontenured paraprofessional, has no property rights in her position (see Donato vPlainview-Old Bethpage Cent. School Dist., 96 F3d 623, 629-630 [1996], cert denied519 US 1150 [1997]). Nor is there is a "stigma-plus" due process claim since there is no evidencethat the reasons for plaintiff's discharge were published by defendants or provided to prospectiveemployers (id. at 631; see McPherson v New York City Dept. of Educ., 457 F3d211, 216-217 [2006]). We also take note that the record demonstrates that plaintiff availedherself of the grievance procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement, and theavailability of a CPLR article 78 proceeding, which plaintiff did not pursue, satisfies due processhearing requirements (see Matter of Tully Constr. Co. v Hevesi, 214 AD2d 465, 466[1995]).
Dismissal of the Executive Law § 296 claim was also proper because plaintiff did notfile a notice of claim within three months of her termination (see Education Law §3813 [1]; Sangermano v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. of Nassau County, 290 AD2d 498[2002], lv dismissed 99 NY2d 531 [2002]). Contrary to plaintiff's argument that herclaim did not accrue until she had exhausted all administrative remedies, an employmentdiscrimination claim accrues on the date that an adverse employment determination is made andcommunicated to plaintiff, and the possibility that the determination may be reversed isinsufficient to toll the limitations period (see Cordone v Wilens & Baker, 286 AD2d 597,598 [2001]).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them unavailing.Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Williams, Sweeny and Catterson, JJ.