| Matter of TAP, Inc. v Dimitriadis |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01894 [49 AD3d 947] |
| March 6, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of TAP, Inc., Respondent, v Tina Dimitriadis, asAssessor of the City of Troy, et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Law Office of Robert L. Beebe, Clifton Park (Maria B. Morris of counsel), forrespondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ceresia, Jr., J.), entered May 9, 2007 inRensselaer County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7, denied respondents'motion for summary judgment dismissing the petition.
Pursuant to RPTL 420-a (1), petitioner, a not-for-profit corporation, applied for a taxexemption on an historic school building in the City of Troy, Rensselaer County that it hadrenovated into an apartment building. Respondent Assessor of the City of Troy denied theexemption, and that denial was upheld by the Board of Assessment Review. Petitioner thencommenced this proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7 seeking a de novo determination that it isentitled to the tax exemption mandated by RPTL 420-a (1) because it is organized for acharitable purpose and its property is being used for a charitable purpose, namely the furnishingof housing to low-income persons. Respondents moved for summary judgment dismissing thepetition. Supreme Court found that respondents failed to meet their burden of proof and deniedthe motion. Respondents appeal.
RPTL 420-a (1) (a) provides: "Real property owned by a corporation or association organizedor conducted exclusively for religious, charitable, hospital, educational [purposes]. . . and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes. . . shall be [*2]exempt from taxation as provided inthis section." To qualify for this tax exemption, "(1) the entity must be organized exclusively forpurposes enumerated in the statute, (2) the property in question must be used primarily for thefurtherance of such purposes, and (3) no pecuniary profit, apart from reasonable compensation,may inure to the benefit of any officers, members, or employees, and (4) the entity may not besimply used as a guise for profit-making operations" (Matter of Miriam Osborn Mem. HomeAssn. v Assessor of City of Rye, 275 AD2d 714, 715 [2000]; see Mohonk Trust v Boardof Assessors of Town of Gardiner, 47 NY2d 476, 483-484 [1979]).
While it is true that petitioner originally applied for this statutory exemption based upon itseducational purposes and did not show that the property was being used for an educationalpurpose, its petition here asserts that petitioner is organized exclusively for charitable purposesand the subject property is used exclusively for housing low-income families. In support of theirmotion for summary judgment dismissing the petition, respondents submitted an affidavit of theAssessor recounting the reasons for denying petitioner's application and citing testimony at thegrievance hearing as insufficient to establish an educational use of the property. Petitioneropposed the motion by submitting an affidavit in which Joseph Fama, its executive director,asserted that its primary objective is the creation and preservation of housing for low-incomepersons. Fama also described petitioner's various activities in furtherance of that objective. In herreply affidavit, the Assessor merely alleged that Fama testified at the grievance hearing that it isnot a charitable organization and that only two of the 20 apartments are leased to low-incomeresidents. In fact, however, the hearing transcript reveals that Fama explained that petitioner isnot charitable only in the sense that it does not collect donations and give those moneys to needypeople. Also, his testimony as to the apartments was that only two are rented at public assistancerates, but the others are rented to people "who have low money."
The provision of housing to low-income persons may constitute a charitable activity (see Matter of Adult Home at Erie Sta., Inc.v Assessor & Bd. of Assessment Review of City of Middletown, 36 AD3d 699, 701[2007], lv granted 8 NY3d 814 [2007]), and the critical factor is whether the providersubsidizes the rentals or charges less than fair market rental rates (see id. at 701;Matter of Presbyterian Residence Ctr. Corp. v Wagner, 66 AD2d 998, 999 [1978],affd 48 NY2d 885 [1979]; cf. Matter of Nassau County Hispanic Found. [Board ofAssessors], 198 AD2d 357, 358 [1993]). In our view, since respondents presented noevidence that petitioner is not currently pursuing the organizational purpose alleged by Fama(see Mohonk Trust v Board of Assessors of Town of Gardiner, 47 NY2d at 484), or thatthe majority of petitioner's apartments are rented at or above market value, respondents failed tomeet their initial burden to show that petitioner is not entitled to the exemption (see Quail Summit, Inc. v Town ofCanandaigua, 19 AD3d 1026, 1028 [2005], lv dismissed 6 NY3d 806 [2006]). Inany event, the record includes Fama's testimony that the rents charged for its apartments arecapped, at least some apartments are rented at reduced rates, and the rental income is less thancould otherwise be realized and is insufficient to meet its expenses. We find this sufficient toraise questions of fact as to petitioner's eligibility for the statutory exemption (see Matter of Eckerd Corp. v Gilchrist,8 AD3d 876, 876 [2004]). Thus, Supreme Court did not err in denying respondents' motionfor summary judgment.
Mercure, J.P., Spain, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed,without costs. [See 2007 NY Slip Op 31041(U).]