| Kun Yong Ke v Oversea Chinese Mission, Inc. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 01924 [49 AD3d 508] |
| March 4, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Kun Yong Ke, Respondent, v Oversea Chinese Mission,Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendant. |
—[*1] Morelli Ratner, PC, New York, N.Y. (Steven C. November of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Oversea ChineseMission, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kelly, J.), datedJanuary 30, 2007, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaintinsofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
This personal injury action arises out of injuries sustained by the plaintiff on February 9,2004, when he allegedly fell from a ladder while repairing leaks on the roof of the Boon Church,owned and operated by the appellant Oversea Chinese Mission, Inc.
Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes liability upon a contractor or owner who fails to providerequired safety devices to a worker at an elevated work site where the lack of such devices is asubstantial factor in causing the worker's injuries, even where the contractor or owner exercisesno supervision, direction, or control over the work being done (see Zimmer v ChemungCounty Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513 [1985]; Madden v Trustees of Duryea Presbyt.Church, 210 AD2d 382 [1994]). Contrary to the appellant's contention, the plaintiff's work inrepairing the leak on the church's roof, wherein he allegedly fell off a ladder and sustained hisinjuries, comes within the ambit of Labor Law § 240 (1). As the appellant failed toestablish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of actionbased upon Labor Law § 240 (1), the Supreme Court [*2]properly denied that branch of the appellant's motion which was forsummary judgment dismissing that cause of action. There exists a triable issue of fact as towhether the ladder the plaintiff was utilizing was secured and whether the plaintiff was suppliedwith the proper safety equipment. The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of theappellant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action pursuant toLabor Law § 241 (6). The appellant failed to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff hadnot sufficiently predicated his claim on a specific violation of the Industrial Code, since theplaintiff alleged that the appellant violated Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.21 (b) (4)(iv) (see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494 [1993]). Mastro, J.P.,Florio, Miller and Dickerson, JJ., concur.