| People v Peters |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 02044 [49 AD3d 957] |
| March 13, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Brion L.Peters, Appellant. |
—[*1] Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (John R. Trice of counsel), forrespondent.
Mercure, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Buckley,J.), rendered January 24, 2005, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminalpossession of a weapon in the third degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degreeand trespass.
Defendant and an accomplice were arrested for trespass after police officers observed themfleeing from a vehicle that was parked behind an automotive garage in the early morning hours ofOctober 6, 2003, and the owner of the garage confirmed that no one had permission to be on thepremises. The arresting officers impounded the vehicle and performed an inventory search,which revealed a .44 Magnum gun and what they believed to be a portable methamphetaminelab, marihuana, and methamphetamine. Defendant was taken to the police station, placed in aholding cell and, during questioning about the incident, admitted that he received the gun from anacquaintance and did not have a permit for it.
Thereafter, defendant was subsequently indicted for two counts of criminal possession of aweapon in the third degree and trespass. Following the denial of defendant's motion to suppressthe gun recovered from the vehicle and statements made at the police station, the matterproceeded to a jury trial, at the close of which defendant was found guilty of criminal possession[*2]of a weapon in the fourth degree, criminal possession of aweapon in the third degree and trespass. He was thereafter sentenced to an aggregate prison termof 2 to 6 years. Defendant appeals and we now affirm.
Initially, defendant argues that County Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the gunfound during the inventory search of his vehicle. He does not dispute that the police werejustified in impounding the vehicle or that police may perform an inventory search of animpounded vehicle to determine its contents (see People v Johnson, 1 NY3d 252, 255 [2003]; People vGonzalez, 62 NY2d 386, 388 [1984]; People v Washington, 233 AD2d 684, 686[1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 1042 [1997]). Rather, he asserts that the search was notconducted according to legally valid procedures. We disagree.
"To be valid, an inventory search must be both reasonable and conducted pursuant toestablished police agency procedures that are designed to meet the legitimate objectives of thesearch while limiting the discretion of the officer in the field" (People v Briggs, 21 AD3d 1218,1219 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 851 [2005] [citations omitted]; see People vJohnson, 1 NY3d at 256; People v Galak, 80 NY2d 715, 719 [1993]). The legitimateobjectives of an inventory search of a vehicle are "protecting an owner's property while it is in thecustody of the police; insuring police against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property; andguarding police and others from dangerous instrumentalities that would otherwise go undetected"(People v Galak, 80 NY2d at 718; see People v Johnson, 1 NY3d at 256).Moreover, it is the People's burden to demonstrate that the search was reasonable and conductedpursuant to standardized police procedures (see People v Johnson, 1 NY3d at 256;People v Briggs, 21 AD3d at 1219; People v Rhodes, 206 AD2d 710, 711 [1994],lv denied 84 NY2d 1014 [1994]).
Here, the record reveals that defendant was provided with a copy of the towing and impoundprocedure of the City of Elmira Police Department at the Mapp hearing. The arrestingofficers testified regarding that procedure, stating that it is standard practice to impound a vehicleleft on private property after all occupants are arrested. The officers performed a cursory searchat the scene to identify who owned the vehicle and determine whether any items inside thevehicle had to be secured for the officers' safety or because the items could be easily lost. A morethorough search of the vehicle was performed at the impound lot for the purpose of safeguardingpolice personnel, protecting the vehicle owner's property and to guard against false claims of lostproperty. The officers contemporaneously logged certain items into evidence, photographed thecar, and listed the items found in an inventory log and the complaint report, which described theproperty contained in the vehicle in detail and identified the gun as one of the items found duringthe search. In our view, this testimony adequately described the established inventory searchprocedure of the police department and its rational relationship to the legitimate governmentalobjectives furthered by inventory searches, as well as demonstrating that the officers compliedwith the procedure to fulfill those objectives. Accordingly, County Court properly denieddefendant's motion to suppress the gun (see People v Briggs, 21 AD3d at 1219; People v Schwing, 13 AD3d 725,725-726 [2004]; People v Washington, 233 AD2d at 686; cf. People v Johnson, 1NY3d at 256-257; People v Bookless, 120 AD2d 950, 950-951 [1986], lv denied68 NY2d 767 [1986]).
Defendant's remaining arguments do not require extended discussion. His assertion that apolice investigator used undue influence to induce him to waive his Miranda rights andmake a statement is unsupported by the record. Rather, the evidence before the suppression courtindicates that defendant "was properly advised of his Miranda rights and voluntarily,knowingly [*3]and intelligently waived them" (People vDuncan, 279 AD2d 887, 888 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 828 [2001]; People vSurdis, 275 AD2d 553, 556 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 908 [2000]). Finally, wehave considered defendant's claim that his sentence was harsh and excessive and conclude that itis lacking in merit.
Spain, Carpinello, Rose and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.