| Matter of State of New York v Cuevas |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 02651 [49 AD3d 1324] |
| March 21, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of the State of New York, Appellant-Respondent, vAnthony Cuevas, Respondent-Appellant. |
—[*1] Emmett J. Creahan, Director, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Rochester (Neil J. Rowe ofcounsel), for respondent-respondent-appellant.
Appeal and cross appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, OneidaCounty (James C. Tormey, J.), entered September 12, 2007. The judgment directed thatrespondent and similar persons who have been held past their maximum release dates atMid-State Correctional Facility pursuant to article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law be afforded thesame rights as inmates held in the long-term protective custody unit in Building 10-2 at thatfacility.
It is hereby ordered that said cross appeal is unanimously dismissed and the judgment isreversed on the law without costs, the habeas corpus proceeding is converted to a declaratoryjudgment action, and judgment is granted as follows:
"It is ADJUDGED and DECLARED that a detained person placed in protective custody shallbe subject to the conditions of confinement set forth in 7 NYCRR 330.4, and
"It is further ADJUDGED and DECLARED that the New York State Department ofCorrectional Services in its discretion may place a detained person eligible for protective custodyin administrative segregation where such placement is required for the security of the correctionalfacility and the safety of that person."
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking, inter alia, an order directingthat respondent, an inmate convicted of a sex offense who at that time was in the custody of theNew York State Department of Correctional Services and was scheduled to be released within afew days, be involuntarily hospitalized at a psychiatric center (see Mental Hygiene Law§ 10.06 [a]). Respondent then sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging in his petition thathe was being detained in involuntary protective custody past the date on which his sentence wascompleted. By the judgment on appeal, Supreme Court, inter alia, directed that respondent andsimilar persons who have been held past their maximum release dates at Mid-[*2]State Correctional Facility (Mid-State) pursuant to article 10 of theMental Hygiene Law be afforded the same rights as inmates held in the long-term protectivecustody unit in Building 10-2 at Mid-State. We note at the outset that, subsequent to the issuanceof the judgment on appeal, respondent consented to confinement in a secure mental healthfacility and is no longer detained at Mid-State. Nevertheless, we agree with both parties that theappeal is not moot because the judgment applies to respondent and to persons similarly situatedat Mid-State, and petitioner's rights continue to be affected by the judgment. Moreover, "this isthe kind of case that falls within the exception [to the mootness doctrine] in that it is likely torecur, will typically evade review, and is substantial and novel" (Mental Hygiene Legal Servs.v Ford, 92 NY2d 500, 506 [1998]).
We further note that respondent also sought an order "requiring Mid-State CorrectionalFacility to create the least restrictive setting on [its] campus to house individuals in similarcircumstances to [respondent] normally during the pendency of the probable cause hearing[pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10] having taken place." We therefore convertrespondent's habeas corpus proceeding to a declaratory judgment action (see CPLR 103[c]; People ex rel. Padilla v Rodriguez, 145 AD2d 922 [1988]).
With respect to petitioner's appeal, we conclude that the court exceeded its authority indetermining that respondent and all other sex offenders detained at Mid-State after the expirationof their sentences pursuant to article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law must be afforded the sameconditions as those inmates held in long-term protective custody in Building 10-2 at Mid-State.Persons such as respondent who are placed in protective custody by prison administrators aresubject to the conditions of confinement set forth in the protective custody regulations issued bythe Department of Correctional Services (see 7 NYCRR 330.4; see also 7NYCRR 301.5). Thus, we agree with respondent that, because he was placed in protectivecustody, he was entitled to the "[c]onditions of confinement" set forth in 7 NYCRR 330.4, andwe grant judgment accordingly. Nevertheless, petitioner is correct that the conditions ofconfinement for inmates in Building 10-2 are more favorable than those required by theregulations applicable to protective custody inmates. Because prison administrators have broaddiscretion to determine, based upon security concerns, whether persons such as respondentshould be afforded the less restrictive conditions in Building 10-2 (see generally Matter ofRivera v Smith, 63 NY2d 501, 512-513 [1984]), we agree with petitioner that prisonadministrators have discretion to place a person eligible for protective custody in administrativesegregation, a more restrictive placement, where such placement is "required for the security ofthe facility and the safety of the [detained person]" (Matter of Rifkin v Goord, 273 AD2d878, 879 [2000]). We therefore further grant judgment accordingly.
Finally, we conclude with respect to the cross appeal of respondent that, based on his consentto confinement in a secure mental health facility, he is no longer aggrieved by the judgment andhis cross appeal therefore must be dismissed (see CPLR 5511). Present—Scudder,P.J., Hurlbutt, Lunn, Green and Gorski, JJ.