| Ramon v Ramon |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 02813 [49 AD3d 843] |
| March 25, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Barbe Ramon, Respondent, v Julio Ramon,Appellant. |
—[*1] Steinberg & Early-Hubelbank PLLC, Westbury, N.Y. (Latonia Early-Hubelbank of counsel),for respondent.
In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered June 28,2005, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the SupremeCourt, Nassau County (Iannacci, J.), entered November 6, 2006, as, without a hearing, deniedthat branch of his motion which was to modify a provision of the parties' stipulation ofsettlement, which was incorporated but not merged into the parties' judgment of divorce, byimposing a cap on the amount of combined parental income upon which annual modifications ofhis child support obligations may be based.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
A stipulation of settlement in a matrimonial action is a contract subject to principles ofcontract interpretation (see Petrovich vObradovic, 40 AD3d 1063, 1065 [2007]; Clark v Clark, 33 AD3d 836, 837 [2006]; Sieratzki v Sieratzki, 8 AD3d 552[2004]; De Luca v De Luca, 300 AD2d 342 [2002]). Where the stipulation is "clear andunambiguous on its face, the intent of the parties must be gleaned from within the four corners ofthe instrument, and not from extrinsic evidence" (Rainbow v Swisher, 72 NY2d 106, 109[1988]; see Perry v Perry, 13 AD3d508, 509 [2004]; Douglas vDouglas, 7 AD3d 481, 482 [2004]).
In this case, the child support provisions of the parties' stipulation of settlement, which wereincorporated but not merged into the parties' divorce judgment, provided that the child support[*2]obligation would be adjusted annually to reflect "incomechanges and major financial changes" of the parties "according to the Child Support StandardsAct" (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b]). The stipulation set forth both theinitial annual and monthly payments of child support to be made by thedefendant—amounting to the statutory guideline percentage rate of 17% applicable to histotal income, less certain deductions (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [b][3] [i])—and set forth his income as of the date of the stipulation, which substantiallyexceeded $80,000 (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c]).
The Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant failed to establish that thestipulation was unfair or inequitable at the time it was made, or that a substantial, unanticipated,and unreasonable change in circumstances had occurred resulting in a concomitant need (seeMerl v Merl, 67 NY2d 359, 362 [1986]; Matter of Davis v Davis, 13 AD3d 623, 624 [2004]; Rich vRich, 234 AD2d 354 [1996]), so as to warrant its modification.
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court erred in failing to impose a cap on thecombined parental income, upon which his child support obligation may be based, is withoutmerit. The stipulation of settlement contains no provision for such a cap (see Phillips vPhillips, 300 AD2d 642, 644 [2002]).
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Lifson, Santucci andBalkin, JJ., concur.