| Milnes v Milnes |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 03179 [50 AD3d 750] |
| April 8, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Marie A. Milnes, Appellant, v Robert Milnes,Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric I. Prusan, Mineola, N.Y., for respondent.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief,from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Gartenstein, J.H.O.), enteredDecember 1, 2006, as, upon a decision of the same court dated June 21, 2006, made after anonjury trial, distributed the net proceeds of the sale of the marital property equally withoutapportioning certain alleged marital debts, and failed to award child support arrears.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In fashioning an award of equitable distribution, the Supreme Court is required to discuss thestatutory factors it relied upon in distributing marital property (see Payne v Payne, 4 AD3d 512,513-514 [2004]). Where it is evident that the Supreme Court considered all relevant factors andthe reasons for its decision are articulated, the court is not required to specifically cite to andanalyze each statutory factor (see O'Brien v O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 589 [1985];Castaldo v Castaldo, 289 AD2d 189, 190 [2001]). Here, the Supreme Court expressly setforth all the factors it considered in determining that the net proceeds of the sale of the maritalresidence should be distributed equally.
The Supreme Court properly declined to treat as marital debt a loan allegedly made by theplaintiff's father to the parties in light of the plaintiff's failure to provide any documentaryevidence of the alleged loan to substantiate her own testimony regarding the alleged indebtedness(see Dermigny v Dermigny, 23AD3d 429 [2005]; Cabeche vCabeche, 10 AD3d 441 [2004]; Phillips v Phillips, 249 [*2]AD2d 527 [1998]). Moreover, the Supreme Court properlyconsidered the total marital assets and financial circumstances of the parties in apportioning theparties' financial obligations incurred before and after the commencement of this action (see Corless v Corless, 18 AD3d493, 494 [2005]; McKeever vMcKeever, 8 AD3d 702, 702-703 [2004]).
The Supreme Court also providently exercised its discretion in crediting the defendant forpayments he made to support the parties' two children who reached their majority during thependency of this action, and in declining to award child support arrears in the absence of anyproof that the payments made were less than those required under the Child Support StandardsAct (see generally Krantz v Krantz, 175 AD2d 863 [1991]; Hite v Hite, 89 AD2d577 [1982]). Skelos, J.P., Lifson, Santucci and Balkin, JJ., concur.