| Pui Sang Lai v Shuk Yim Lau |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 03186 [50 AD3d 758] |
| April 8, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Pui Sang Lai, Also known as Paul Lai, et al.,Appellants, v Shuk Yim Lau, Also Known as Shuk Yim Li, et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Hack, Piro, O'Day, Merklinger, Wallace & McKenna, P.A., New York, N.Y. (Rebecca K.Megna and Jeffery Berson of counsel), for respondents Shuk Yim Lau, Also known as Shuk YimLi, and Che Sun Li, Also known as Thomas C.S. Li. Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Paul M. Tarr, Richard Granofsky, andSteven B. Prystowsky of counsel), for respondent Barry I. Siegel.
In an action, inter alia, in effect, to recover damages for breach of contract, fraud, andviolation of Judiciary Law § 487, and for an accounting, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited bytheir brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bucaria, J.), datedDecember 7, 2006, as, in effect, granted the motion of the defendant Barry I. Siegel for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, and granted those branches ofthe motion of the defendants Shuk Yim Lau, also known as Shuk Yim Li, and Che Sun Li, alsoknown as Thomas C.S. Li, which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, second, third,and fourth causes of insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar appealed from, with one bill of costs payable to therespondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
On March 10, 2000, the defendant Shuk Yim Lau, also known as Shuk Yim Li (hereinafterthe seller), who is the wife of the defendant Che Sun Li, also known as Thomas C.S. Li, soldcertain real property titled [*2]in her name. The plaintiffssubsequently commenced the instant action against the seller, her husband, and the defendantBarry I. Siegel, an attorney who represented the seller in connection with the sale of the property.The plaintiffs sought to recover half of the proceeds of the sale, alleging that they owned a 50%interest in the subject real property by virtue of an agreement they entered into with the seller andher husband in 1986.
The Supreme Court properly, in effect, granted Siegel's motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. On his motion, Siegel made a primafacie showing of his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v ProspectHosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). He established, among other things, that there was noevidence of his intent "to deceive, or a chronic, extreme pattern of legal delinquency thatproximately caused the [plaintiffs'] alleged damages" (Knecht v Tusa, 15 AD3d 626, 627 [2005] [internal quotation marksomitted]; see Judiciary Law § 487). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise atriable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324).
The Supreme Court also properly awarded the seller and her husband summary judgmentdismissing the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action insofar as asserted against them.On their cross motion, they made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as amatter of law with respect to these causes of action (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68NY2d at 324). The seller and her husband established, among other things, that the plaintiffsfailed to perform any of their obligations under the agreement and therefore, the agreement wasunenforceable (see GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales, 66 NY2d 965, 968 [1985];see also Furia v Furia, 116 AD2d 694, 695 [1986]). The seller and her husband alsoestablished that they did not induce the plaintiffs to enter into the agreement by misrepresenting amaterial fact collateral to the agreement (see Ross v DeLorenzo, 28 AD3d 631, 636 [2006]). In opposition,the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2dat 324).
The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit. Lifson, J.P., Florio, Covello andChambers, JJ., concur.