| Laura WW. v Peter WW. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 03281 [50 AD3d 1292] |
| April 11, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| Laura WW., Respondent, v Peter WW.,Appellant. |
—[*1] Laura WW., Delhi, respondent pro se.
Spain, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Peckham, J.), entered August 8,2007 in Delaware County, which granted plaintiff's application for counsel fees, and (2) from thejudgment entered thereon.
In this action, after entry of a judgment of divorce, plaintiff moved for an order directingdefendant to pay her counsel fees. After a hearing, Supreme Court granted the motion andentered a judgment in the amount of $5,047.50. Defendant appeals, and we now affirm.
The facts of this case are more completely set forth in our decision affirming the judgment ofdivorce (Laura WW. v Peter WW., 51 AD3d 211 [2008] [decided herewith]). Defendant does not challenge the calculated amount of fees, butargues that Supreme Court abused its discretion in finding that he should bear the cost of thosefees because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she could not pay them herself. It is within thesound discretion of the trial court to award counsel fees in a matrimonial action (seeDomestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; Bellinger v Bellinger, 46 AD3d 1200, 1203 [2007]; Farrell vCleary-Farrell, 306 AD2d 597, 600 [2003]). Where the trial court has considered all relevantfactors, the determination should not be disturbed unless the award is clearly unjustified (seeHolterman v Holterman, 307 AD2d 442, 444 [2003], affd 3 NY3d 1 [2004];Vicinanzo v Vicinanzo, 193 AD2d 962, 966 [1993]).
Here, Supreme Court appropriately considered the relevant factors, including the [*2]relative disparity in the parties' income, even after child support wassubtracted from defendant's income and added to plaintiff's income, the balanced equitabledistribution of the marital assets, and the parties' other resources and obligations. Defendant'sreliance on the fact that plaintiff took title to the marital home is unavailing; "[t]he fact that [theprevailing party] is employed and has some financial resources of [his or] her own is notdispositive" (Mac Murray v Mac Murray, 187 AD2d 840, 841 [1992]; see Harringtonv Harrington, 300 AD2d 861, 864-865 [2002]). Under these circumstances, we cannot findthat Supreme Court abused its discretion in awarding counsel fees (see Coon v Coon, 29 AD3d 1106,1112 [2006]; Holterman v Holterman, 307 AD2d at 444; Zielinski v Zielinski,252 AD2d 800, 801 [1998]).
Cardona, P.J., Carpinello, Kavanagh and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order andjudgment are affirmed, without costs.