| Matter of County of Broome |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 03285 [50 AD3d 1300] |
| April 11, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Foreclosure of Tax Liens by County of Broome.County of Broome, Respondent; Castle Heights, LLC, Appellant. |
—[*1] Joseph Sluzar, County Attorney, Binghamton (Robert G. Behnke of counsel), forrespondent.
Lahtinen, J. Appeals (1) from an order of the County Court of Broome County (Mathews, J.),entered January 16, 2007, which, in a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 11, deniedrespondent's motion to vacate a default judgment entered against it, and (2) from an order of saidcourt, entered April 9, 2007, which denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.
In the 1970s, John O'Brien purchased two undeveloped parcels with a combined sizeexceeding 150 acres in the Town of Chenango, Broome County and, in 1998, he transferred thisproperty to respondent, a limited liability company of which he was the sole owner. The addressfor respondent's tax bill was changed in 2000 from O'Brien's business address at One AcademicDrive in the City of Binghamton, Broome County, to his home address at 3228 Dogwood Drive,Binghamton. O'Brien died in May 2002 and his estate received and paid respondent's 2003 taxbill. O'Brien's home was sold in 2003 and no new tax billing address for respondent wassupplied. When the 2004 taxes were not paid, petitioner conducted a title search, which revealedthe deed from O'Brien to respondent but no other pertinent information.
In November 2005, petitioner sent a notice of foreclosure (and opportunity to redeem) [*2]by certified mail to the 3228 Dogwood Drive address. The mailingwas returned to petitioner stamped, "attempted—not known." Petitioner searched theSecretary of State's Web site, finding an additional address for respondent of One AcademicDrive, P.O. Box 915, Binghamton, and a notice sent by regular mail to that address was returnedwith the notation, "attempted—not known, unable to forward." Notices of the foreclosurewere also published in two local newspapers.
No payment was made to redeem the property and, in September 2006, a judgment offoreclosure granted petitioner title. O'Brien's executors ostensibly learned of the foreclosure inOctober 2006 but their offer at that time to pay the past taxes was rejected, resulting in a motionby respondent to vacate the foreclosure judgment. Supreme Court denied the motion and also amotion to renew. Respondent appeals.
Respondent argues that petitioner's efforts at providing notice of the foreclosure wereinadequate to meet the requirements of due process. "[D]ue process requires the government toprovide 'notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties ofthe pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections' " (Jonesv Flowers, 547 US 220, 226 [2006], quoting Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & TrustCo., 339 US 306, 314 [1950]; seeMatter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]; Kennedy vMossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 9 [2003]). "A balance must be struck between the State's interest incollecting delinquent property taxes and those of the property owner in receiving notice"(Matter of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d at 140 [citations omitted]). In balancingthese interests of the municipality and the owner, "consideration is given to the conduct of theowner in evaluating the reasonableness of the notice efforts" (Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d 79, 84 [2006][internal quotations marks and citations omitted]). Whether there has been compliance with theflexible concept of due process turns on a "case-by-case analysis that measures thereasonableness of a municipality's actions in seeking to provide adequate notice" (Matter ofHarner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d at 140; see Matter of Zaccaro v Cahill, 100 NY2d884, 890 [2003]; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d at 9-11).
Here, petitioner mailed the notice by certified mail to the address that respondent hadprovided. This was the address used in prior years to mail tax bills, which had been paid, andsuch mailings and payments occurred both before and after O'Brien's death. Since respondent is acorporation, petitioner further sought information about it from the Secretary of State's Web site.While that resulted in another mailing address, the notice sent to the additional address was alsoreturned. The information available from the Secretary of State did not list a registered agent forrespondent and made no mention of O'Brien as an owner or having any other role withrespondent. Although petitioner asserts that more detailed information was available for a feefrom the Secretary of State and would have revealed that O'Brien had an interest in respondent,due process does not require the municipality to go to such lengths to find information that thetaxpayer is obligated to keep updated with the taxing authorities (see Jones v Flowers,547 US at 235-236; Matter of County of Clinton [Bouchard], 29 AD3d at 84). Petitionerwas not required to search the records of the Surrogate's Court under O'Brien's name since theowner of the property was a corporation and petitioner did not have notice of O'Brien'sownership of respondent (cf. RPTL 1125 [1] [a]). The fact that O'Brien had been thetransferor on the deed to respondent in 1998 did not place petitioner on notice that O'Brien wasalso the owner of the transferee. Documents such as the TP-584 and EA 5217 executed at thetime of that transfer—which might have directly or at least implicitly indicated O'Brien'sinterest in respondent—had been destroyed by the time petitioner conducted its search ofthe public records in 2005 because [*3]they were over six yearsold. While the result herein is regretable, we are constrained to conclude that the proceduresemployed by petitioner were not violative of due process.
The motion to renew was properly denied since it failed to meet the criteria for such a motion(see Tibbits v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 40AD3d 1300, 1302 [2007]) and, in any event, the additional evidence submitted in thatmotion would not change the result in this case.
Mercure, J.P., Spain, Rose and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders are affirmed,without costs.