| Hirschfeld v Teller |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 03422 [50 AD3d 855] |
| April 15, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Sidney Hirschfeld, Director, Mental Hygiene Legal Service,Appellant, v Mitchell Teller et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Greenberg, Formato & Einiger, LLP, LakeSuccess, N.Y. (Sarah C. Lichtenstein of counsel), for respondents.
In an action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that the Mental Hygiene Legal Service hasthe right of access to the mentally ill residents of neurobiological units of WoodmereRehabilitation and Health Care Center, Inc., Brookhaven Rehabilitation and Health Care Center,LLC, Meadow Park Rehabilitation and Health Care Center, LLC, New Surfside Nursing Home,LLC, and Golden Gate Rehabilitation and Health Care Center, LLC, the plaintiff appeals from anorder of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Robbins, J.), dated November 8, 2006, whichdenied his motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' cross motion for summaryjudgment.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the SupremeCourt, Nassau County, for, inter alia, entry of a judgment declaring that the Mental HygieneLegal Service does not have the right of access to the mentally ill residents of neurobiologicalunits of Woodmere Rehabilitation and Health Care Center, Inc., Brookhaven Rehabilitation andHealth Care Center, LLC, Meadow Park Rehabilitation and Health Care Center, LLC, NewSurfside Nursing Home, LLC, and Golden Gate Rehabilitation and Health Care Center, LLC.
Sidney Hirschfeld, the Director of Mental Hygiene Legal Service (hereinafter MHLS),commenced this action to gain access for MHLS to mentally ill residents of neurobiological unitsof the defendant nursing homes. Mental Hygiene Law § 47.01 (a) provides that MHLS"shall provide legal assistance to patients or residents of a facility as defined in section 1.03 ofthis chapter, [*2]or any other place or facility which is required tohave an operating certificate" issued by the Office of Mental Health (hereinafter OMH). In thepresent case OMH has already determined that the defendant nursing homes are not required toobtain OMH operating certificates. A court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency(see Flacke v Onondaga Landfill Sys., 69 NY2d 355, 363 [1987]; Flaherty vMcCall, 262 AD2d 890 [1999]). MHLS failed to raise a question of fact in response to thisprima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law that its statutory mandate doesnot encompass the defendant nursing homes. Therefore the Supreme Court properly granted thedefendants' cross motion for summary judgment.
The parties' remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.
Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the matter must be remitted to theSupreme Court, Nassau County, for, inter alia, the entry of an appropriate judgment (seeLanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317, 334 [1962], appeal dismissed 371 US 74 [1962],cert denied 371 US 901 [1962]). Lifson, J.P., Florio, Angiolillo and Chambers, JJ.,concur.