Maroney v Hawkins
2008 NY Slip Op 03427 [50 AD3d 862]
April 15, 2008
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 18, 2008


Thomas J. Maroney, Appellant,
v
Eileen Lynch Hawkins etal., Respondents.

—[*1]Ryan, Brennan & Donnelly LLP, Floral Park, N.Y. (John E. Ryan of counsel), forappellant.

McManus Collura & Richter, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Scott C. Tuttle of counsel), forrespondents.

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an orderof the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bucaria, J.), entered November 8, 2006, which grantedthat branch of the defendants' motion which was to stay the action and compel arbitration, anddenied his cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint, and (2) an order of the samecourt entered June 22, 2007, which denied his motion, in effect, for reargument.

Ordered that the appeal from the order entered June 22, 2007 is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the order entered November 8, 2006 is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants.

The appeal from the order entered June 22, 2007 must be dismissed. The plaintiff's motion,denominated as a motion for leave to renew and reargue, was, in effect, a motion for reargumentbecause it was not based on new facts (see CPLR 2221 [d] [2]). An order denying amotion for reargument is not appealable (see Viola v Blanco, 1 AD3d 506, 507 [2003]; Sabetfard vSmith, [*2]306 AD2d 265, 266 [2003]).

Turning to the merits of the earlier order, the right to compel arbitration arises only bycontract and arbitrable matters are limited to those contained within the contract (seeCPLR 7501, 7503 [a]; Matter of Perrin v Stempinski Realty Corp., 15 AD2d 91[1961]). Moreover, a written agreement that is clear and unambiguous as a matter of law must beenforced according to the plain meaning of its terms (see Greenfield v Philles Records,98 NY2d 562, 569 [2002]; RoyalSun Alliance Ins. Co. v Travelers Ins. Co., 15 AD3d 563 [2005]; Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc. v PlainedgeUnion Free School Dist., 12 AD3d 395, 396 [2004]).

Here, the shareholders' agreement between the parties provided, in pertinent part, for threemethods of valuing a departing shareholders' interest in the subject law firm: "[1] as agreed uponby the departing Shareholder and the firm, or in the absence of such an agreement, [2] at anappraised value as determined by two qualified appraisers, one selected and paid by theShareholder and one selected and paid by the firm. [3] If the two appraisers do not agree as tovalue, they shall select a third appraiser (whose fee shall be shared equally). The three appraisalsshall be averaged. Any dispute not resolved by the parties must be submitted to the AmericanArbitration Association for resolution." The plaintiff withdrew from the subject law firm on June30, 2004. The parties apparently were unable to agree on their own as to the value of theplaintiff's interest in the firm pursuant to the first valuation method. They thereafter agreed toobtain a fair market valuation of the plaintiff's interest in the firm. Pursuant to the secondvaluation method set forth in the shareholders' agreement, the firm retained an appraiser whoissued a report valuing the plaintiff's 25% interest in the firm as of his departure date at$268,025, but which did not consider the value of the plaintiff's share of the firm's liabilities.Rather than retain his own appraiser, as required under the second valuation method, the plaintiffinformed the firm that he accepted the valuation of the defendants' appraiser. After thedefendants refused to pay the plaintiff $268,025 on the grounds that he had already received ortaken 25% of the firm's assets prior to or on his departure date and had not been assessed hisshare of the firm's liabilities, the plaintiff commenced the instant action to recover damages forbreach of contract, seeking to recover the $268,025 representing his share of his interest in thefirm, as determined by the defendants' own appraiser. The defendants moved to dismiss thecomplaint or to stay the action and compel arbitration, and the plaintiff cross-moved for summaryjudgment on the complaint. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendants' motionwhich was to stay the action and compel arbitration and denied the plaintiff's cross motion. Weaffirm.

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, his decision to accept the valuation reached by thedefendants' appraiser, rather than retain a separate appraiser, as required by the second valuationmethod in the shareholders' agreement, did not bind the defendants to their appraiser's valuation.The plain language of the agreement set forth that when the parties applied the second valuationmethod, they were bound by their appraiser's valuation only if both appraisers agreed as to value.The plaintiff accepted the valuation reached by the defendants' appraiser and never retained hisown appraiser. Thus, pursuant to the plain language of the shareholder's agreement, the entireissue of valuation became arbitrable, including the value of the plaintiff's outstanding liabilitiesto the firm and whether the plaintiff has already been compensated for his interest in the firm.Fisher, J.P., Ritter, Dillon and McCarthy, JJ., concur.


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