| Lunja v Mocha Limo Car Serv. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 03597 [50 AD3d 971] |
| April 22, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Suzana Lunja, Appellant, v Mocha Limo Car Service et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Baker, McEvoy, Morrissey & Moskovits, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Stacy R. Seldin of counsel),for respondent Mocha Limo Car Service.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an orderof the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), entered June 11, 2007, which granted thedefendants' separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as assertedagainst each of them on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning ofInsurance Law § 5102 (d), and (2) an order of the same court dated August 15, 2007,which denied her motion, in effect, for leave to renew and reargue her opposition to thedefendants' separate motions for summary judgment.
Ordered that the order entered June 11, 2007 is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs,and the defendants' separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar asasserted against each of them is denied; and it is further,
Ordered that appeal from the order dated August 15, 2007 is dismissed, without costs ordisbursements.
On their separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendantsfailed to meet their prima facie burdens of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a seriousinjury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident(see Toure v Avis [*2]Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345[2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). Since the defendants failed tosatisfy their prima facie burdens, it is unnecessary to consider whether the plaintiff's oppositionpapers were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med.Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
The appeal from so much of the order dated August 15, 2007, as denied that branch of theplaintiff's motion which was, in effect, for leave to reargue must be dismissed, since no appeallies from an order denying reargument. The appeal from so much of the order dated August 15,2007, as denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was, in effect, for leave to renew mustbe dismissed as academic in light of our determination on the appeal from the order entered June11, 2007. Fisher, J.P., Florio, Angiolillo, Dickerson and Belen, JJ., concur.