Matter of Citizens Organized to Protect the Envt. v Planning Bd. ofTown of Irondequoit
2008 NY Slip Op 03729 [50 AD3d 1460]
April 25, 2008
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, June 18, 2008


In the Matter of Citizens Organized to Protect the Environment, byits Members, Robert Brinkman, and Another, Appellant, v Planning Board of the Town ofIrondequoit et al., Respondents. (Appeal No. 1.)

—[*1]Phillips Lytle LLP, Rochester (Alan J. Bozer of counsel), for petitioner-appellant.

Harris, Chesworth, O'Brien, Johnstone, Welch & Leone, LLP, Rochester (Michael P. Leoneof counsel), for respondent-respondent Planning Board of the Town of Irondequoit.

Harris Beach PLLC, Pittsford (Douglas A. Foss of counsel), for respondent-respondent KarlaV. Gerrie.

Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Monroe County(Thomas A. Stander, J.), entered December 7, 2006 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78.The judgment dismissed the petition for lack of standing.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed withoutcosts.

Memorandum: We conclude with respect to the judgment in appeal No. 1 that SupremeCourt properly agreed with respondents that petitioner, Citizens Organized to Protect theEnvironment (COPE), lacks standing to bring this proceeding and dismissed the CPLR article 78petition challenging various determinations of respondent Planning Board of the Town ofIrondequoit (Town). To establish that it had the requisite associational standing to bring theproceeding, COPE was required to establish "that at least one of its members would havestanding to sue, that it is representative of the organizational purposes it asserts and that the casewould not require the participation of individual members" (New York State Assn. of Nurse Anesthetists v Novello, 2 NY3d207, 211 [2004]). COPE failed to meet that burden inasmuch as its petition, which wasprimarily concerned with the environmental effects on property owned by Robert Brinkman andChristina Brinkman, would require the participation of the Brinkmans (see Matter of DentalSocy. of State of N.Y. v Carey, 61 NY2d 330, 333-335 [1984]). Further, petitioner [*2]failed to preserve for our review its contentions that the Brinkmanswere in fact parties to the proceeding, should have been joined as necessary parties (seeCPLR 1001 [a]), or that the petition should be amended to include them as petitioners pursuant toCPLR 3025 (see Ciesinski v Town of Aurora, 202 AD2d 984 [1994]).

We conclude with respect to the order in appeal No. 2 that the court properly denied themotion of the Brinkmans for an order permitting them to intervene in the proceeding anddirecting that they be added as petitioners. The court properly rejected the contention of theBrinkmans in support of their motion that they were entitled to intervene as a matter of rightbecause COPE's representation of their interests was inadequate and they would be bound by anyjudgment issued in the proceeding. "[W]hether [a] movant will be bound by [a] judgment withinthe meaning of [CPLR 1012 (a) (2)] is determined by its res judicata effect" (VantagePetroleum, Bay Isle Oil Co. v Board of Assessment Review of Town of Babylon, 61 NY2d695, 698 [1984]). The dismissal of COPE's petition based on COPE's lack of standing had no resjudicata effect because the Brinkmans were not parties to the proceeding, nor were they in privitywith COPE (see Kaczmarek v Shoffstall, 119 AD2d 1001, 1002 [1986]). We conclude inany event that res judicata does not apply because the court did not decide the merits of thepetition (see generally Alco Gravure, Inc. v Knapp Found., 64 NY2d 458, 465[1985]).

Further, we reject the contention of the Brinkmans that they were entitled to interveneby permission of the court. "CPLR 7802 (d) provides that the court may permit 'other interestedpersons' to intervene in a proceeding, conferring upon the court broader authority to allowintervention in an article 78 proceeding than is permitted pursuant to CPLR 1013, which requiresthat a claim or defense proposed to be asserted in an action involve 'a common question of law orfact' " (Roosevelt Islanders for Responsible Southtown Dev. v Roosevelt Is. OperatingCorp., 291 AD2d 40, 48 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 613 [2002], quotingFerguson v Barrios-Paoli, 279 AD2d 396, 399 [2001]). Intervention in a CPLR article 78proceeding "is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court" (Matter of White vIncorporated Vil. of Plandome Manor, 190 AD2d 854, 854 [1993], lv denied 83NY2d 752 [1994]), however, and we perceive no abuse of discretion or improvident exercise ofdiscretion inasmuch as the court concluded that intervention would unduly delay thedetermination of the proceeding and would be prejudicial to the Town. Present—Scudder,P.J., Martoche, Centra, Fahey and Peradotto, JJ.


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