| Matter of Bert M. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 03766 [50 AD3d 1509] |
| April 25, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Bert M., Jr., and Another, Infants. Jefferson CountyDepartment of Social Services, Respondent; Bert M., Sr., et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Dennis A. Germain, Watertown, for respondent-appellant Margaret M. Caraccioli & Nelson, PLLC, Watertown (Kathryn G. Wolfe of counsel), forpetitioner-respondent. Susan A. Sovie, Law Guardian, Watertown, for Charles M. Mai Lutterus Liinve, Law Guardian, Watertown, for Bert M., Jr.
Appeals from an order of the Family Court, Jefferson County (Richard V. Hunt, J.), enteredMarch 28, 2007 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order,among other things, revoked a suspended judgment and terminated respondents' parental rights.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law byremitting the matter to Family Court, Jefferson County, for further proceedings in accordancewith the memorandum and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Respondents, the parents of the children who are the subject of thisproceeding, appeal from an order that, inter alia, revoked the suspended judgment entered uponthe finding that they had permanently neglected their children and terminated their parentalrights. We note at the outset that the mother failed to preserve for our review her contentions thatFamily Court erred in accepting her consent to the finding of permanent neglect withoutconducting a further inquiry and that reversal is required because she was not given noticepursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b (3) (e) that the proceeding may result in an orderfreeing the children for adoption. In any event, we conclude that those contentions are withoutmerit.
The parents each contend that petitioner failed to use diligent efforts to strengthen andencourage their relationship with their children (see Social Services Law § 384-b[7] [a]). To the extent that their contention relates to petitioner's efforts prior to the adjudicationof permanent neglect, we do not review it inasmuch as they consented to that adjudication (see Matter of Ulawrence J., 10 AD3d658, 659 [2004]; see also Matter ofJerome Marcel T., 28 AD3d 780, 781 [2006]). To the extent that their contention relatesto petitioner's efforts during the period of the suspended [*2]judgment, we conclude that it is without merit. The recordestablishes that petitioner provided the parents with a "coparent" who assisted with householdmanagement skills and arranged supervised visitation with the children. Furthermore, petitionerprovided services for the mother with respect to personal hygiene, employment skills, andfinancial management skills, and petitioner provided services for the father that includedparenting classes and counseling services (see generally Matter of Aldin H., 39 AD3d 914, 915 [2007]).Contrary to the contention of the parents, the court properly determined that they failed to fulfillthe conditions of the suspended judgment. More than mere participation in the programs offeredby petitioner is required. Rather, "[a]t a minimum, a parent is required to address and overcomethe 'specific personal and familial problems which initially endangered or proved harmful to thechild[ren], and which may in the future endanger or possibly harm the child[ren]' " (Matter ofGrace Q., 200 AD2d 894, 895 [1994]; see also Matter of Jessica J., 44 AD3d 1132, 1133-1134 [2007];Matter of Shawna DD., 289 AD2d 892, 894 [2001]).
Finally, we note that the court's determination that termination of parental rights was in thebest interests of the children was made prior to our decision in Matter of Kahlil S. (35 AD3d1164 [2006], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 977 [2007]), in which we determined thatpost-termination contact between parents and their children may be appropriate where, inter alia,parental rights are terminated after a finding of permanent neglect. We therefore modify the orderby remitting the matter to Family Court to determine, following a further hearing, if necessary,whether post-termination contact between the parents and their children is in the best interests ofthe children (see id. at 1166;Matter of Thomas B., 35 AD3d 1289 [2006], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 936 [2007]).Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Smith, Centra and Pine, JJ.