| People v McLaurin |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 03772 [50 AD3d 1515] |
| April 25, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Keith M.McLaurin, Appellant. |
—[*1] Jon E. Budelmann, District Attorney, Auburn (Christopher T. Valdina of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Cayuga County Court (Mark H. Fandrich, J.), rendered June30, 2005. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of obstructing governmentaladministration in the second degree and resisting arrest.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, following a joint trialwith two codefendants, one of whom was his son, of obstructing governmental administration inthe second degree (Penal Law § 195.05) and resisting arrest (§ 205.30). Bothdefendant and his son were charged with resisting the son's arrest, and defendant was alsocharged with, inter alia, obstructing governmental administration by acting to prevent the arrestof his son. Defendant's son was acquitted.
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the verdicts are repugnantbased on the fact that his son was acquitted (see generally People v Maldonado, 11 AD3d 114 [2004], lvdenied 3 NY3d 758 [2004]) and, in any event, we reject that contention. "[A] conviction willbe reversed [as repugnant] only in those instances where acquittal on one crime as charged to thejury is conclusive as to a necessary element of the other crime, as charged, for which the guiltyverdict was rendered" (People v Tucker, 55 NY2d 1, 7 [1981], rearg denied 55NY2d 1039 [1982]). That rule also applies when one codefendant is convicted of a crime whileanother is acquitted of the same crime (see generally People v Green, 71 NY2d 1006,1008 [1988]; People v Hampton, 61 NY2d 963, 964 [1984]). With respect to the chargeof resisting arrest against defendant's son, the jury's finding that the People failed to provebeyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's son "prevented or attempted to prevent a policeofficer from performing an authorized arrest of himself" did not negate any element of either theresisting arrest charge or obstructing governmental administration charge against defendant.Defendant further contends that the verdicts are repugnant because both he and his son reliedupon the same defense at trial, i.e., that the son was never present, and the jury must have foundthat the son was not present in order to acquit him. We reject that contention inasmuch as itinvolves "an attempt to divine the jury's collective mental process of weighing the evidence,"which is prohibited (Tucker, 55 NY2d at 4).
Contrary to defendant's further contention, the verdict is not against the weight of the [*2]evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490,495 [1987]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Smith, Centra, Peradotto and Pine, JJ.