| People v Caban |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 04208 [51 AD3d 455] |
| May 6, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Lynette Caban, Appellant. |
—[*1] Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York (Marc Krupnick of counsel), forrespondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Budd G. Goodman, J.), rendered April 28,2005, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminally negligent homicide, and sentencingher to a term of 1 to 3 years, unanimously reversed, on the law, and the matter remanded for anew trial.
The subject incident occurred when defendant was backing up her Jeep Grand Cherokeealong the west side of Third Avenue, moving south (the wrong way on a one-way thoroughfare)toward the intersection with East 107th Street. As defendant moved the Jeep, against a red light,into the pedestrian right-of-way at the northwest corner of Third Avenue and East 107th Street,the vehicle struck an elderly pedestrian who had been crossing Third Avenue heading west. Theimpact threw the pedestrian through the air and onto the asphalt, resulting in fatal injuries. ThePeople's expert estimated that the Jeep was moving in the range of 13 to 19 miles per hour whenit struck the pedestrian. At the time, the Jeep's rear passenger-side window was missing and hadbeen replaced with a taped black plastic bag, thereby reducing visibility in the direction fromwhich the pedestrian had been approaching.
The evidence of the foregoing facts presented at trial was sufficient to support the verdictconvicting defendant of criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law § 125.10), given thatthe jury could rationally conclude that it had been proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, thatdefendant's failure to perceive the risk of death created by her conduct "constitute[d] a grossdeviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation"(Penal Law § 15.05 [4]; see People v Boutin, 75 NY2d 692, 695-696 [1990]). Inaddition, the verdict comported with the weight of the evidence.
A new trial is required, however, based on the trial court's erroneous admission intoevidence, on the People's case, of testimony by an employee of the Department of MotorVehicles to the effect that, at the time of the incident, defendant's driver's license was suspended.Contrary to the People's arguments, the suspension of defendant's license had no relevance to thecase; it was neither a background fact necessary to explain the situation to the jury, nor was it[*2]probative of whether defendant "gross[ly] deviat[ed] from thestandard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation" (Penal Law §15.05 [4]). Even in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, this Court hasheld that a defendant's "license suspension was clearly irrelevant to the issues of negligence andproximate cause" and "could have had no purpose other than to prejudicially influence the jurors"(White v Molinari, 160 AD2d 302, 303 [1990]). This principle would have at least equalapplicability in a criminal case, where the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We notethat, since defendant was not charged with having intended to cause the victim's death (which noone claimed was the case), but with having failed to use due care to avoid an unintended result,the People's argument that the license suspension "tended to disprove [defendant's] claim ofmistake or accident" is a non sequitur. Further, under the circumstances, the admission of theevidence of the license suspension was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error (see People v Resek, 3 NY3d 385,389 [2004] [admission of evidence of uncharged crime was reversible error where "the prejudiceto defendant outweighed the probative value of the evidence"]). In view of the foregoing, weneed not reach defendant's remaining arguments. Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Nardelliand Catterson, JJ.