Farrow v O'Connor, Redd, Gollihue & Sklarin, LLP
2008 NY Slip Op 04313 [51 AD3d 626]
May 6, 2008
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, July 16, 2008


Cathleen Farrow, Appellant,
v
O'Connor, Redd, Gollihue& Sklarin, LLP, et al., Respondents.

[*1]Charles G. Mills, Glen Cove, N.Y., for appellant.

O'Connor Redd LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Steven M. O'Connor and Vincent M. Lyons ofcounsel), for respondents.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation, the plaintiff appeals from ajudgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Slobod, J.), dated February 13, 2007, which,upon an order of the same court, among other things, granting that branch of the defendants'motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, is in favor of the defendantsand against her, dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this defamation action against her former employer, the defendantlaw firm, O'Connor, Redd, Gollihue & Sklarin, LLP, and the law firm's office manager, thedefendant Debra A. Nichols. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants sent a letter containingdefamatory statements to a third party, her insurance company, which was processing her claimfor no-fault benefits in connection with a car accident. The Supreme Court granted that branch ofthe defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. We affirm.

Expressions of an opinion, "false or not, libelous or not, are constitutionally protected andmay not be the subject of private damage actions" (Sassower v New York Times Co., 48 AD3d 440, 442 [2008][internal quotation marks omitted]). "The issue of distinguishing between actionable fact andnon-actionable opinion is a question of law for the court" (Gjonlekaj v Sot, 308 AD2d471, 474 [2003]; see Silsdorf v Levine, 59 NY2d 8, 13 [1983], cert denied 464US 831 [1983]). Here, the defendants demonstrated their entitlement to summary judgment byestablishing that the communication at issue, which amounted [*2]to a subjective characterization of the plaintiff's behavior and anevaluation of her job performance, constituted a nonactionable expression of opinion (seeLeone v Rosenwach, 245 AD2d 343 [1997]; Ott v Automatic Connector, 193 AD2d657, 658 [1993]; Miller v Richman, 184 AD2d 191, 193 [1992]; Angel v LevittownUnion Free School Dist. No. 5, 171 AD2d 770, 773 [1991]; Williams v Varig BrazilianAirlines, 169 AD2d 434, 438 [1991]; Hollander v Cayton, 145 AD2d 605, 606[1988]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light ofour determination. Fisher, J.P., Ritter, Florio and Carni, JJ., concur.


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