| Matter of Kimaya Mc. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 04352 [51 AD3d 671] |
| May 6, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Kimaya Mc., a Person Alleged to be a JuvenileDelinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Leonard Koerner and Larry A.Sonnenshein of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal isfrom an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Turbow, J.), dated July 6, 2007,which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated April 13, 2007, made after a hearing,finding that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would haveconstituted the crimes of assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in thefourth degree, adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent and placed her on probation for a periodof 18 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated April 13, 2007.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
On July 18, 2006 the appellant and the complainant got into a verbal argument. The appellanthit the complainant first and then a fight broke out between them. The appellant allegedly pickedup a concrete brick from the ground and hit the complainant with the brick three or four times inher left eye.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matterof David H., 69 NY2d 792 [1987]; cf. People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), wefind that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellantcommitted acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of assault inthe second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (see Matter of Lenford C., 35 AD3d462 [2006]; Matter of Nicholas A.,28 AD3d 477 [2006]). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power(cf. CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the determination was not against the weight ofthe evidence (see Matter of Lenford[*2]C., 35 AD3d 462 [2006]).
The appellant also argues that the Family Court improperly admitted the complainant'smedical records, without redacting statements contained therein that she was hit with a brick.However, this objection was not presented to the Family Court, and thus is not preserved forappellate review (see People v Santiago, 108 AD2d 939 [1985]). In any event, thestatements were properly admitted because they were relevant to the diagnosis and treatment ofthe complainant's injuries (see People vChia Yen Yun, 35 AD3d 494 [2006]; People v Singleton, 140 AD2d 388[1988]).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court providently exercised its discretionin imposing an 18-month period of probation, particularly in view of the nature of the incidentand the appellant's poor school attendance and performance record (see Matter of Gerald W., 12 AD3d522 [2004]; Matter of Steven R., 230 AD2d 745 [1996]). Spolzino, J.P., Miller,Covello and Balkin, JJ., concur.