| Savoy Mgt. Corp. v Leviev Fulton Club, LLC |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 04442 [51 AD3d 520] |
| May 15, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Savoy Management Corporation, Appellant, v LevievFulton Club, LLC, et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., New York (Neil R. Finkston of counsel), for Leviev Fulton Club,LLC and Fulton Club, LLC, respondents. Law Office of Yevgeny Tsyngauz, Brooklyn (Yevgeny Tsyngauz of counsel), for WonderWorks Construction Corp., respondent. Wachtel & Masyr, LLP, New York (Jeffrey T. Strauss of counsel), for Conway Stores, Inc.,respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Leland DeGrasse, J.), entered January 9, 2008,which, to the extent appealed from, granted defendants' motions to dismiss the first cause ofaction, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
The stipulation of settlement declared, in part, that in the event defendants were thereafter tofile plans or apply to the New York City Department of Buildings (DOB) and commenceconstruction of residential or commercial space higher than the highest roof on the currentstructure, the $2 million termination fee due plaintiff would be increased by another $1.5 million.Plaintiff alleged, in its first cause of action, that defendants breached that provision, entitling it tothe additional termination fee.
Plaintiff has not pleaded a viable claim for breach of this section of the settlement agreement.The complaint alleges that defendants filed plans and made application to the DOB in late June2006, indicating its intention to construct residential space higher than the highest roof of thebuilding. However, the settlement agreement, dated nearly four weeks later, stated that thetermination fee would be increased only in the event that defendants were to "hereafter" file therequisite plans or make application with the DOB, in other words, subsequent to execution of theagreement.
A valid stipulation should be construed as an independent agreement subject to thewell-settled principles of contractual interpretation (Matter of Stravinsky, 4 AD3d 75, 81 [2003]). Whether a contract isambiguous is a question of law, and extrinsic evidence may not be considered unless thedocument itself is ambiguous (South Rd.Assoc., LLC v International Bus. Machs. Corp., 4 NY3d 272, 278 [2005]). Since theagreement is not ambiguous, extrinsic [*2]evidence may not beused to create such an ambiguity (see Kass v Kass, 91 NY2d 554, 568 [1998]), and thepurported documentary evidence submitted by plaintiff in opposition to defendants' motions didnot remedy the defect in its complaint. Indeed, "the intention of the parties may be gathered fromthe four corners of the instrument and should be enforced according to its terms" (Beal Sav. Bank v Sommer, 8 NY3d318, 324 [2007]). This agreement simply does not support plaintiff's contention that theadditional termination fee provision extended to plans filed before execution of the stipulation.Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Friedman, Buckley, Sweeny and Renwick, JJ.