| Vernali v Harrison Cent. School Dist. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 04507 [51 AD3d 782] |
| May 13, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Gerard J. Vernali et al., Respondents, v Harrison CentralSchool District et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant. |
—[*1] Friedman, Harfenist, Langer & Kraut, LLP, Lake Success, N.Y. (Andrew C. Lang and StevenJ. Harfenist of counsel), for plaintiffs-respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Harrison Central SchoolDistrict and Louis M. Klein Middle School appeal from an order of the Supreme Court,Westchester County (Liebowitz, J.), entered November 27, 2007, which denied their motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted againstthem.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the appellants' motion forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against themis granted.
The infant plaintiff, a 12-year-old boy, allegedly sustained injuries when he was struck by acar while running across the street, in the rain, after being dismissed from school. The plaintiffsalleged, inter alia, that the defendants Harrison Central School District and Louis M. KleinMiddle School (hereinafter the appellants) were negligent in dismissing the infant plaintiff in anarea that they knew was hazardous.
The infant plaintiff called his mother on his cellular phone when he was released fromschool. The mother told him that she was parked on the street across from the school. The motherwaved to the infant plaintiff and directed him to her car. At one corner of the street there was astop sign, crossing guard, and crosswalk. At the other corner there was a traffic signal and acrosswalk. [*2]The infant plaintiff chose to cross in the middle ofthe street at the direction of and under the supervision of his mother, rather than at the supervisedarea located on school property designated by the school district for the pick-up and discharge ofstudents.
A school is not an insurer of the safety of its students (see Tarnaras v Farmingdale SchoolDist., 264 AD2d 391 [1999]). Its duty of care stems from effectively taking the place ofparents and guardians and is "coextensive with and concomitant to its physical custody of andcontrol over the child" (Pratt v Robinson, 39 NY2d 554, 560 [1976]; see Chainani vBoard of Educ. of City of N.Y., 201 AD2d 693 [1994], affd 87 NY2d 370 [1995]). Aschool's custodial duty ceases once the student has passed out of its orbit of authority and theparent is perfectly free to reassume control over the child's protection (see Pratt vRobinson, 39 NY2d at 560). Generally, a school cannot be held liable for injuries that occuroff school property and beyond the orbit of its authority (see Bertrand v Board of Educ. ofCity of N.Y., 272 AD2d 355 [2000]).
The appellants established, prima facie, their entitlement to summary judgment dismissingthe complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them upon the ground that they didnot owe a duty to the infant plaintiff because he was not on school property and was under thecontrol of his mother (id.). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existenceof a triable issue of fact.
Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the appellants did not provide a safeplace for dismissal or that the appellants created a hazard which could extend their duty tosupervise (see Ernest v Red Cr. Cent. School Dist., 93 NY2d 664, 672 [1999]). Skelos,J.P., Covello, Eng and Leventhal, JJ., concur.