| R.U.M.C. Realty Corp. v JCF Assoc., LLC |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 04849 [51 AD3d 993] |
| May 27, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| R.U.M.C. Realty Corp., Appellant, v JCF Associates, LLC,Respondent. |
—[*1] Georgoulis & Associates, PLLC, New York, N.Y. (George Sitaras of counsel), forrespondent.
In an action to recover damages for tortious interference with contract and conversion, theplaintiff appeals (1), as limited by its notice of appeal and brief, from so much of an order of theSupreme Court, Kings County (F. Rivera, J.), dated December 15, 2006, as granted that branch ofthe defendant's cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action torecover damages for tortious interference with contract, and (2), as limited by its brief, from somuch of an order of the same court dated May 18, 2007, as, upon renewal, granted that branch ofthe defendant's cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action torecover damages for conversion, which was denied in the order dated December 15, 2006.
Ordered that the order dated December 15, 2006 is reversed insofar as appealed from, on thelaw, without costs or disbursements, and that branch of the defendant's cross motion which wasfor summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for tortiousinterference with contract is denied; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated May 18, 2007 is affirmed insofar as appealed from, withoutcosts or disbursements.
The plaintiff leased certain commercial property from Robson Sales Corporation (hereinafterRobson). A rider to the lease contained a provision requiring that the plaintiff be given the rightof first refusal in the event of a sale of the premises during the lease term. During the lease term,Robson sold the premises to the defendant.[*2]
The plaintiff then commenced the instant action againstthe defendant. The plaintiff asserted a cause of action to recover damages for tortiousinterference with contract, alleging, inter alia, that Robson breached the lease by failing to give itthe opportunity to exercise its right of first refusal, and that the defendant intentionally procuredthat breach. In addition, alleging that the defendant improperly destroyed certain propertyremaining in the premises after the plaintiff vacated the premises, the plaintiff asserted a cause ofaction to recover damages for conversion.
The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant's cross motion whichwas for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for tortiousinterference with contract. In order to succeed on such a cause of action, the plaintiff mustestablish: (1) the existence of a valid contract between it and a third party, (2) the defendant'sknowledge of that contract, (3) the defendant's intentional procurement of the third party's breachof that contract without justification, and (4) damages (see Lama Holding Co. v SmithBarney, 88 NY2d 413, 424 [1996]; Foster v Churchill, 87 NY2d 744, 749-750[1996]). While the defendant established, prima facie, that it did not intentionally procureRobson's alleged breach of the lease provision at issue, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of factas to whether this was the case. Furthermore, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination,while Robson and the plaintiff entered into a "surrender agreement" releasing Robson from itsobligations under the lease, that agreement, entered into several months after the contract for thesale of the premises was executed, does not preclude the plaintiff from asserting its cause ofaction to recover damages for tortious interference with contract (cf. Bogoni v Friedlander,197 AD2d 281, 288 [1994]).
However, the Supreme Court, upon renewal, correctly granted that branch of the defendant'scross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recoverdamages for conversion. The defendant demonstrated its entitlement to judgment as a matter oflaw with respect to this cause of action by establishing, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not havea "possessory right or interest in" the allegedly converted property (Colavito v New YorkOrgan Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43, 50 [2006]), which, one of the plaintiff's co-ownersacknowledged, was owned by another entity. In response, the plaintiff failed to raise a triableissue of fact.
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are not properly before this Court, without merit, or donot require reversal. Rivera, J.P., Covello, Angiolillo and McCarthy, JJ., concur. [See 14Misc 3d 1206(A), 2006 NY Slip Op 52426(U).]