| People v Ballard |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 04881 [51 AD3d 1034] |
| May 27, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Tyrone Ballard, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Lori Glachman, andTamar Bruger of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Guzman, J.),rendered September 8, 2006, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance inthe fifth degree and unlawful possession of marijuana, upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifthdegree (see Penal Law § 220.06 [5]) was supported by legally sufficient evidence.Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People were not required to prove that he hadknowledge of the weight of the cocaine he possessed in order to establish that he committed thecrime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (see People vEstrella, 303 AD2d 689 [2003]). Penal Law § 220.06 (5) (as amended by L 1995, ch75, § 1), provides that "[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substancein the fifth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses . . . cocaine andsaid cocaine weighs five hundred milligrams or more." Construing this provision in accordancewith its plain language, as we must (see People v Garson, 6 NY3d 604, 611 [2006]), theterm "knowingly" applies only to the possession element of the crime, and not to the weightelement.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in replacing a sworn juror afterlearning that the juror, who had called the court's clerk advising that he would not be in court thatday due to "stomach pains," would not be able to appear for more than two hours after trial wasset [*2]to resume. The court made a "reasonably thoroughinquiry" (CPL 270.35 [2] [a]) into the juror's unavailability, afforded the parties the opportunityto be heard, and placed the facts and reasons for its determination on the record (see CPL270.35 [2] [a], [b]; People v Jeanty, 94 NY2d 507, 516-517 [2000]; People v Shelton,31 AD3d 791, 791-792 [2006]). Further, since the defendant never objected to thereplacement of the sworn juror on any constitutional ground, his constitutional claim on thismatter is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217, 222[1996]; People v Olibencia, 45 AD3d 607, 608 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 814[2008]). In any event, the claim is without merit. "[R]eplacement [of a sworn juror] with analternate juror is not, as a rule, a violation of the right to trial by jury" (People v Jeanty,94 NY2d at 517) as "there is no material distinction between regular and alternate jurors"(People v Ortiz, 92 NY2d 955, 957 [1998]) prior to deliberations (see People vJeanty, 94 NY2d at 517). Here, the defendant participated in the selection of the alternatejuror and the alternate's substitution for the discharged juror was neither arbitrary nor made"without good cause as prescribed by law" (id.). Rivera, J.P., Spolzino, Dickerson andEng, JJ., concur.