| People v Johnson |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 07153 [54 AD3d 969] |
| September 23, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v LyleJohnson, Appellant. |
—[*1] Thomas P. Zugibe, District Attorney, New City, N.Y. (Itamar J. Yeger of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland County (Nelson,J.), rendered December 19, 2006, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substancein the first degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminalpossession of marihuana in the second degree, and criminally using drug paraphernalia in thesecond degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review thedenial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppressphysical evidence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We reject the defendant's contention that the search of his residence by parole officersviolated his right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only did thedefendant consent to the search of his residence, but also, he had previously executed a"Certificate of Release," which, although not "a blanket waiver of all constitutional rights to besecure from unreasonable searches and seizures," authorizes a parole officer to search adefendant's person, residence, and property, where, as here, the search was rationally andreasonably related to the parole officer's duties to prevent violations of parole (People vHuntley, 43 NY2d 175, 182-183 [1977]; see People v Brown, 276 AD2d 635[2000]). Moreover, the evidence established that parole officers initiated and conducted thesearch based on the statements of the defendant's girlfriend and the defendant's admission topossession of marihuana. Since the search by the [*2]paroleofficers was in furtherance of parole purposes and related to their duties as parole officers, theassistance of police officers at the scene did not render the search a police operation (seePeople v Johnson, 63 NY2d 888 [1984]; People v Montero, 44 AD3d 796, 797 [2007]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree beyond areasonable doubt. The evidence established that the defendant exercised a sufficient level ofdominion and control over the subject room of the residence, including possession of the key tothe safe in which cocaine was found, to support the jury's finding that he constructively possessedthe cocaine found in the safe (see People v Manini, 79 NY2d 561, 573 [1992]; People v Price, 14 AD3d 718[2005]; People v Nunziata, 10AD3d 695 [2004]; People v Hojas, 271 AD2d 547 [2000]; People v Bright,210 AD2d 244 [1994]). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power (seeCPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of theevidence (see People v Romero, 7NY3d 633 [2006]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).Fisher, J.P., Balkin, McCarthy and Chambers, JJ., concur.