| Matter of Vomero v City of New York |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 07251 [54 AD3d 1045] |
| September 30, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Edward J. Vomero, Respondent, v City ofNew York et al., Appellants. |
—[*1] Passarello & LaRosa (John Z. Marangos, Staten Island, N.Y., of counsel), for appellantG.A.C. Catering, Inc. Samuel L. Scollar, Staten Island, N.Y., for respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board ofStandards and Appeals of City of New York dated August 9, 2005, which, after a hearing,granted the application of G.A.C. Catering, Inc., for a use variance, City of New York, Board ofStandards and Appeals of City of New York, and Department of Buildings of City of New Yorkappeal, and G.A.C. Catering, Inc., separately appeals, from a judgment of the Supreme Court,Richmond County (Aliotta, J.), dated August 7, 2006, which granted the petition and annulledthe determination.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs to the appellantsappearing separately and filing separate briefs, the determination is confirmed, the petition isdenied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits.
Pursuant to New York City Zoning Resolution § 72-21, in order to issue the requesteduse variance, the Board of Standards and Appeals of City of New York (hereinafter the BSA)was required [*2]to find that the proposed development byG.A.C. Catering, Inc. (hereinafter GAC), met the following five specific requirements: (a) thatbecause of "unique physical conditions" of the property, conforming uses would impose"practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship;" (b) that also due to "unique physical conditions,"conforming uses would not "enable the owner to realize a reasonable return" from the zonedproperty; (c) the proposed variances would "not alter the essential character of the neighborhoodor district;" (d) the owner did not create the practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship; and (e)only the "minimum variance necessary to afford relief" is sought. Local zoning boards havebroad discretion, and judicial review is thus limited to determining whether a zoning board'sdetermination was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion (see Matter ofPecoraro v Board of Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 2 NY3d 608, 613 [2004]; Matter ofB.Z.V. Enter. Corp. v Srinivasan, 35 AD3d 732 [2006]). Here, the BSA's determinationgranting GAC's application for a use variance had a rational basis in the record and was notillegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Ifrah v Utschig,98 NY2d 304, 308-309 [2002]; Matter of DeCaro Capital Inv. Group, LLC v Voekler,32 AD3d 852 [2006]; Matter of Halperin v City of New Rochelle, 24 AD3d 768, 771[2005]).
We note that, as to the first factor, the BSA found that some other properties in the area,which have similar characteristics and are in locations similar to the property at issue here, had"unique physical conditions" such that "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship" wouldarise with conforming use. There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that there isany substantial difference between the property at issue here and those other properties (seeMatter of Campo Grandchildren Trust v Colson, 39 AD3d 746 [2007]).
Further, the BSA found that the property would not produce a financially feasible return ifdeveloped for any of the "as of right" uses. In light of the evidence submitted by GAC, thisfinding was not arbitrary and capricious, despite the presence of countervailing evidence, whichwas not conclusive.
Finally, we note that, contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the fact that the lot inquestion was purchased with the knowledge that it was subject to the restrictions sought to bevaried, did not, by itself, constitute a self-created hardship (see NY City ZoningResolution § 72-21 [d]). Fisher, J.P., Florio and Chambers, JJ., concur.
Lifson, J., dissents and votes to affirm the judgment with the following memorandum, inwhich Angiolillo, J., concurs.
Lifson and Angiolillo, JJ. (dissenting). G.A.C. Catering, Inc. (hereinafter GAC), purchased alot zoned for residential use, on the corner of Hylan Boulevard and Otis Avenue in RichmondCounty, for the sum of $275,500 in September 2003. GAC demolished the home on the propertyand applied for a use variance to construct a two-story photography studio in its place. Thatapplication was denied. GAC applied to the respondent Board of Standards and Appeals of Cityof New York (hereinafter the BSA). After a hearing, the BSA granted the application for thevariance. The petitioner, an owner of a neighboring home, commenced the within CPLR article78 proceeding, seeking to annul the determination of the BSA. The Supreme Court granted thepetition on the ground that the BSA's determination lacked a "substantial basis" in the record, andthis [*3]appeal ensued.
This appeal, of necessity, must examine whether or not there was sufficient evidence beforethe BSA to grant the relief requested by GAC. The facts before the BSA showed that the lot inquestion was approximately 5,690 square feet, located in a residential zone, improved by aresidential home before such home was demolished, and encumbered with a five-foot wideningline on its Otis Avenue side. Properties on the other side of Hylan Boulevard are commercial innature.
In support of its application, GAC argued that the unique physical condition of the siteincluding, inter alia, the irregular shape of the lot and the five-foot widening line encumbrance,would create practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship and prevent any economically feasibleredevelopment of the property for residential use.
At the hearing, the following proof was submitted in support of GAC's application: (1) a landuse diagram, demonstrating, among other things, that of 56 corner lots, the subject property isone of three that remain residential lots; (2) an economic feasibility study dated December 28,2004, prepared by Equity Valuation Associates, comparing the proposed use with other potential"as of right" uses, including development of a medical office, or some derivative of a multipledwelling; (3) a map showing that the lot in question, bordered by Hylan Boulevard, Otis Avenue,and Bryant Avenue, is wholly residential in character, and (4) a letter from a realtor endeavoringto demonstrate that the traffic and noise along Hylan Boulevard impaired interest by prospectiveresidential users of the property. In accordance with this proof, GAC submitted that it could onlyexpect about a 1% return on its investment even if used as a two- or three-unit residence. Despitethat analysis, the only appraisal submitted in the record indicated the value of the parcel as vacantland within the existing zoning regime as $375,000 in April of 2004, a significant return on theinvestment.
The BSA also heard testimony as to GAC's proposed use of the subject premises. GAC ownsa catering hall across the street on Otis Avenue and is desirous of building a facility on thesubject premises to photograph individuals using the catering hall. During the hearing, it wasrepresented on behalf of GAC that while there would be insufficient parking for multipleresidential uses, there would be sufficient parking for GAC's intended commercial use because itwas contemplated that people using the catering hall (i.e., wedding/bar mitzvah parties and such)would not drive to the photography facility on the subject premises, but would merely walkacross Otis Avenue.
In order to grant the variance the applicable zoning code provision requires the BSA to makecertain mandated findings—all of which must be present before a variance can be granted.Use variances are governed by New York City Zoning Resolution § 72-21. To obtain a usevariance predicated upon an alleged practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship, the applicantmust show, and the BSA must find, that: (a) the lot in question is unique and the difficultyattends to that circumstance and not to the strict application of the zoning regulation at issue; (b)because of the alleged physical condition of the property, there is no reasonable possibility thatdevelopment of the property within the existing zoning regulation will yield a reasonable returnof investment; (c) the variance will not alter the character of the neighborhood, impair the use ordevelopment of adjacent property, and will not be detrimental to the public welfare; (d) thenecessity of the variance is not self-created, except the mere purchase of the lot within the zonein question shall not itself be deemed a self-created hardship; and (e) the variance in [*4]question is the minimum variance necessary to afford relief.
In reviewing the record before the BSA, the Supreme Court made several cogent findings,which in my opinion are unassailable, in concluding that GAC did not show (and the BSA couldnot properly find) that all of these requisites were met. In pertinent part, the Supreme Courtconcluded, contrary to the findings of the BSA, that GAC's hardship was self-created. As themajority notes (and I do not dispute), under the controlling code provisions, the fact that thehardship in question may be self-created, in and of itself, might not be dispositive. However, inthis case, the BSA's finding that the hardship was not self-created, which was not even necessaryto grant the application, is so contraindicated by the record that such finding is illustrative of thearbitrary nature of the BSA's actions.
As the Supreme Court noted, purchasers are presumed to know the zoning regulations inquestion. Here, the property lies in an area zoned residential. In situations such as in the instantcase, contracts routinely are made conditional on a variance to be granted in futuro. Noexplanation was provided as to why that was not done here. In the instant case, the hardship didnot arise from the mere fortuitous location of the lot within the residential zone or even thepurchase of property in ignorance of the applicable zoning regulations. On the contrary, therecord shows that GAC purchased the lot and demolished the improvements thereon without anyattempt to utilize the property in conformance with the code or to obtain a variance prior tounilaterally changing the character of the property and the improvements thereon.
More significantly, the Supreme Court also determined that the BSA's finding that the lot inquestion was unique was also contrary to the record before it. The subject lot is approximatelythe same size as most of the other residential lots situated in the subject area—all of whichare encumbered by the same five-foot widening easement and all of which were capable ofresidential use.
The evidence before the BSA showed that the lot in question was adjacent to a commercialarea. While this circumstance may impair its desirability, it did not render the propertyunmarketable or unfeasible for residential use (see Matter of Wilcox v Zoning Bd. of Appealsof City of Yonkers, 17 NY2d 249, 254 [1966]; Greenbaum v Board of Estimate of Cityof N.Y., 148 AD2d 92 [1989]). On the contrary, the BSA had before it uncontrovertedevidence that the assessed valuation of the property had increased substantially since the time ofGAC's purchase, and that the market value of the property as a vacant residentially zoned parcel,if sold, would yield a significant annualized profit to GAC—hardly a circumstance uponwhich the BSA could predicate a finding of financial hardship. The Supreme Court concludedthat at least two of the required findings by the BSA were not supported by any evidence and thatthe BSA's determination to grant the variance was utterly irrational and prohibited by the expressterms of the zoning resolution.
The alleged hardship suffered by GAC is unique to its use of the catering hall across thestreet, because GAC felt it needed to add a photography component to the catering hall. Afinding of unique hardship, however, must be based upon the uniqueness of the land causing theplight, and not the uniqueness of the plight of the owner (see Matter of Fasani v Rappaport,30 AD2d 588 [1968]). Moreover, the fact that the subject property abuts or is in closeproximity to a commercial zone is not peculiar to that parcel, and cannot constitute the type of"hardship" that is required to obtain a use variance (see Matter of Seinfeld v Murdock,259 App Div 694 [1940], affd 285 NY 718 [1941]). The fact that the property is on a[*5]thoroughfare with heavy traffic is similarly not a basis for thegranting of a variance (see Matter of Save the Pine Bush v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town ofGuilderland, 220 AD2d 90 [1996]; Matter of Shiner v Board of Estimate of City of N.Y.,95 AD2d 831 [1983]).
Throughout the various submissions to this Court, it was argued by the BSA and GAC thatthe character of the surrounding area had substantially changed, from residential to commercial,to such a substantial degree that, as a practical matter, the area had developed in a mannerinconsistent with that contemplated by the framers of the zoning code. That argument, at firstblush, might seem persuasive, but it fails both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, theargument appears to be a rationalization after the fact. The original application was based onGAC's assertion that the existing zoning regulations imposed a hardship on it due to theuniqueness of the parcel in question. Thus, the character of the neighborhood was not the focalpoint of the application before the BSA. Nonetheless, evidence was presented to the BSA and theBSA did make a finding with respect to the changed character of the neighborhood. Because"changed character of the neighborhood" was not asserted in GAC's application (nor was it theprimary basis for the BSA's determination to grant the variance), the petitioner, in seeking toannul the BSA's determination, should not have been permitted to raise such issue before theSupreme Court. That which was not raised in the initial application cannot be raised for the firsttime in a CPLR article 78 proceeding or the subsequent appeal (see Sprain Brook ManorNursing Home v Glazer, 6 AD3d 522 [2004]).
Substantively, the argument regarding the changed character of the neighborhood is alsowithout merit. The applicant's burden was and is to establish hardship. The nearby existence ofcommercial uses similar to the one sought by GAC did not require the BSA to conclude thatGAC's residentially-zoned land is subjected to unnecessary hardship (see Matter of Johnson vTown of Queensbury Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 8 AD3d 741 [2004]). A zoning board mayconsider the effect of the uses previously permitted by it, and the cumulative effect on the area ofexisting uses plus the new one proposed by the application (see Matter of Josato, Inc. vWright, 35 AD3d 470 [2006]). Even the fact that one or more use variances of the typesought by the applicant have been granted does not relieve the applicant of its burden to proveunnecessary hardship. The existing uses in the neighborhood are but one factor to consider alongwith all of the circumstances of the case, in determining whether such hardship exists (seeMatter of Cowan v Kern, 41 NY2d 591 [1977]). Here, the Supreme Court found, and Iconcur, that while GAC's proposed use of the premises would not significantly alter "theessential character of the larger neighborhood, the granting of a variance in this case can onlyproduce a negative effect on the viability of the remaining residential uses." Moreover, as themap of the lots in the area clearly show, there is no commercial use of the lots bordered by HylanBoulevard and Otis and Bryant Avenues. Given the requisites of the controlling zoningordinance, the potential proof of changed character is insufficient to satisfy the mandates forissuance of a variance of New York City Zoning Resolution § 72-21.
Based on the totality of the proof, the BSA should not have granted the application inquestion. For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Supreme Court granting the petition andannulling the BSA's determination must be affirmed. I therefore respectfully dissent.