| Puma v New York City Tr. Auth. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 07646 [55 AD3d 585] |
| October 7, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Joseph Puma, Respondent, v New York City Transit Authority,Appellant, et al., Defendant. |
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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant New York City TransitAuthority appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Flug, J.), dated October 22,2007, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as assertedagainst it.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant NewYork City Transit Authority for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted againstit is granted.
"In order to impose liability in a slip-and-fall case, there must be evidence tending to show theexistence of a dangerous condition and that the defendant either created the defect or had actual orconstructive notice of it" (Medina v Sears,Roebuck & Co., 41 AD3d 798, 799 [2007]).
The plaintiff alleged that he was caused to fall on a staircase located in a New York City Subwaystation when his foot got caught in a drainage canal which is part of the staircase. It is undisputed thatthe staircase was built by the defendant New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA). Insupport of its motion, the NYCTA established that the drainage canal was not an inherently dangerousor defective condition inasmuch as it is located at the extreme edge of the stairway tread, underneaththe handrail (see e.g. Dominitz v Food Emporium, 271 AD2d 640 [2000]). Morever, theNYCTA further [*2]demonstrated that the canal provides the usefuland beneficial function of draining accumulated water off of the staircase. The plaintiff's opposition,which consisted only of an affirmation by the plaintiff's counsel, failed to establish the existence of atriable issue of fact. "[S]ummary judgment in favor of a defendant is appropriate where a plaintiff fails tosubmit any evidence that a particular condition is actually defective or dangerous" (Przybyszewski vWonder Works Constr., 303 AD2d 482, 483 [2003]; see Tresgallo v Danica, 286 AD2d326 [2001]; Varrone v Dinaro, 209 AD2d 508 [1994]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the motion by the NYCTA for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. In light of this determination, it isunnecessary to consider the NYCTA's remaining contentions. Spolzino, J.P., Ritter, Santucci andCarni, JJ., concur.