| Matter of James U. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 07812 [55 AD3d 972] |
| October 16, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of James U., a Child Alleged to be Neglected. TompkinsCounty Department of Social Services, Respondent; Claire OO.,Appellant. |
—[*1] Margaret McCarthy, Tompkins County Department of Social Services, Ithaca, for respondent. Natalie B. Miner, Law Guardian, Homer.
Rose, J. Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Tompkins County (Rowley, J.), entered May22, 2007, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10,to extend the period of petitioner's supervision of respondent.
Respondent's parental rights to three of her four children were terminated under circumstances setforth in our earlier decisions (see Matter ofVivian OO., 34 AD3d 1084 [2006]; Matter of Vivian OO., 34 AD3d 1111 [2006], lv denied 8NY3d 808 [2007]; Matter of Brandon OO., 304 AD2d 873 [2003]; Matter of BrandonOO., 289 AD2d 721 [2001]). Respondent's fourth child, James U. (born in 2002), was found tobe derivatively neglected on similar grounds in 2005. Family Court's dispositional order in thatproceeding returned James to respondent's care under the supervision of petitioner until March 2006.The order also imposed certain conditions, including that respondent not permit the child's father tohave any contact with him. The order was later extended until March 2007 and, in January 2007,petitioner sought an additional one-year extension. After a hearing, Family Court found a continuing riskthat respondent might allow the child's father in her household and granted petitioner's application, [*2]prompting respondent's current appeal.
As a preliminary matter, petitioner argues that the extended order of supervision has beensuperseded by a subsequent decision and order that removed James from respondent's custody and,therefore, this appeal is moot. We disagree. Inasmuch as respondent's challenge is directed at FamilyCourt's continuation of the conditions upon her retention of custody of James and it was her allegedviolation of one of those conditions that led to her later loss of custody, her appeal is not moot (seeMatter of Rachel A., 278 AD2d 528, 529 [2000], lv dismissed 96 NY2d 854 [2001]).
Turning to the merits, we find a sound basis in the record to support Family Court's determinationthat although respondent had made progress in her parenting skills and cooperated with petitioner'ssupervision, there remained the risk that she would permit the child's father to have contact with thechild. Despite respondent's disavowals of any intention to allow the father to return to her household,the evidence established that she continues to deny that the father previously had abused one of herdaughters and that she does not fully comprehend the risk posed to James. The child's Law Guardianalso perceived this risk and supported the extension of supervision. Deferring to Family Court'sassessment of witness credibility, we agree that good cause was shown for the extension of the order ofsupervision and the conditions which it imposed (see Matter of Amanda WW., 43 AD3d 1256, 1257 [2007]; Matterof Caleb L., 289 AD2d 902, 902 [2001]).
We are equally unpersuaded by respondent's alternate contention that she did not receive theeffective assistance of counsel in opposing the extension of the order. While the suggestion in counsel'sclosing argument that the child's father be permitted to return to the child's home may have beenill-considered, counsel nonetheless fully presented respondent's grounds for terminating the order ofsupervision by eliciting testimony that she had complied with its conditions and cooperated withpetitioner. Accordingly, viewing the totality of the circumstances here, we find that respondent wasprovided meaningful representation (seeMatter of Brenden O., 20 AD3d 722, 723 [2005]; Matter of James P., 17 AD3d 733, 734-735 [2005]).
Mercure, J.P., Peters, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, withoutcosts.