| Dokaj v Ruxton Tower Ltd. Partnership |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 07858 [55 AD3d 661] |
| October 14, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Don Dokaj et al., Appellants, v Ruxton Tower LimitedPartnership et al., Respondents. (And a Third-Party Action.) |
—[*1] Smith Mazure Director Wilkins Young & Yagerman, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Andrea Kleinmanand Joel M. Simon of counsel), for respondents Ruxton Tower Limited Partnership, Jeffrey B. Lewis,and Eric D. Rosenfeld. Costello, Shea & Gaffney, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Frederick N. Gaffney and Sooyung T.A. Leeof counsel), for respondent Armor Kone Elevator, Inc., sued herein as Armor Kone Elevator Co.,Inc.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by theirbrief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Schulman, J.), dated January26, 2007, as denied their motion, in effect, to vacate the automatic dismissal of the action pursuant toCPLR 3404.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and themotion, in effect, to vacate the automatic dismissal of the action pursuant to CPLR 3404 is granted.
In an order dated May 9, 2000, issued after the plaintiffs filed a note of issue, the Supreme Courtgranted motions to compel certain discovery. In so doing, the court indicated that because "discoveryhad not been completed," the note of issue was "stricken," and could be "re-file[d]" upon thecompletion of discovery. However, the note of issue was never re-filed.[*2]
On May 10, 2000 the action was stricken from the trialcalendar. One year later the action was automatically dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404.
When an action is stricken from the trial calendar as a result of the vacatur of the note of issue, theaction returns to pre-note of issue status (seeGalati v C. Raimondo & Sons Constr. Co., Inc., 35 AD3d 805, 806 [2006]; Travis v Cuff, 28 AD3d 749, 750[2006]). Since CPLR 3404 is inapplicable in an action in pre-note of issue status, that statute did notprovide a basis for the dismissal of the action (see Galati v C. Raimondo & Sons Constr. Co., Inc.,35 AD3d at 806; Travis v Cuff, 28AD3d 749, 750 [2006]).
Thus, the instant action was improperly dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3404. Under thesecircumstances, the plaintiffs should not have been required to move to vacate the dismissal of the action(cf. Andre v Bonetto Realty Corp., 32AD3d 973, 975 [2006]; Travis v Cuff,28 AD3d 749, 750 [2006]). Skelos, J.P., Covello, Balkin and Dickerson, JJ., concur.