| Matter of Hartsdale Fire Dist. v Greenburgh Uniform Firefighters Assn., Inc.,Local 1586, IAFF, AFL-CIO |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 07911 [55 AD3d 731] |
| October 14, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Hartsdale Fire District, Appellant, v GreenburghUniform Firefighters Association, Inc., Local 1586, IAFF, AFL-CIO,Respondent. |
—[*1] Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Richard S. Corenthal of counsel), forrespondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration, the petitioner appeals,as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella,J.), entered November 13, 2007, as dismissed the petition.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The arbitration provision of the parties' collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter the CBA) isbroad, as it provides for arbitration of disputes "concerning the meaning, application or interpretation ofthis Agreement, which remains unresolved after presentation to, and processing through the grievanceprocedure." Further, the CBA provides that a grievance may be pursued for "any question or problemthat may arise." Here, there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the disputes,which involves the respondent's grievances over the petitioner's directives that the respondent's unionmembers work and train in a fire-damaged firehouse before the firehouse was fully repaired, and thegeneral subject matter of the CBA (see Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist.[Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 NY2d 132, 143 [1999]). Moreover, the arbitration clause in theCBA does not specifically exclude from arbitration the subject matter of the grievances, which concernpublic health and the safety of public employees (see Matter of Silverman [Benmor Coats], 61NY2d 299, 308 [1984]). Accordingly, the question of the scope of the [*2]substantive provisions of the CBA is a matter of contract interpretationand application reserved for the arbitrator (see Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown CitySchool Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 NY2d at 143; Board of Educ. of LakelandCent. School Dist. of Shrub Oak v Barni, 49 NY2d 311, 314 [1980]; Matter of New YorkCity Tr. Auth. v Amalgamated Tr. Union of Am., AFL-CIO, Local 1056, 284 AD2d 466 [2001];Matter of Greenburgh Eleven Union Free School Dist. v Greenburgh No. 11 Fedn. of Teachers,Local 1532 AFT, AFL-CIO, 266 AD2d 213 [1999]).
There is no merit to the petitioner's contention that the trial court could address the issue of whetherthe respondent failed to comply with a condition precedent before demanding arbitration. In general,disputes over the parties' adherence to the grievance procedure set forth in the parties' CBA is for thearbitrator to determine, not for the courts (seeMatter of Diamond Waterproofing Sys., Inc. v 55 Liberty Owners Corp., 4 NY3d 247, 252[2005]). Under the circumstances, the petitioner's contention that grievances must be pursued only byindividual employees, rather than by the respondent, especially in light of the respondent's contentionthat the petitioner has a past practice of hearing grievances pursued solely by the respondent, is amatter for the arbitrator to resolve.
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Angiolillo, Carni and Eng, JJ.,concur.