People v Bowens
2008 NY Slip Op 08108 [55 AD3d 809]
October 21, 2008
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 10, 2008


The People of the State of New York, Respondent,
v
AnthonyBowens, Appellant.

[*1]Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Anna Pervukhin of counsel), for appellant.

Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., District Attorney, Staten Island, N.Y. (Morrie I. Kleinbart andLauren-Brooke Eisen of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Meyer, J.),dated March 22, 2007, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant toCorrection Law § 168-l.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant engaged in a sexual relationship with a 32-year old woman Neisha, as well as withher 12-year-old daughter. Neisha learned of her daughter's sexual relationship with the defendant whenher daughter gave birth to the defendant's child. The defendant does not controvert the assessment of120 points to him by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders, but he contends that the SupremeCourt improperly denied him a downward departure from level three to level two sex offender status.The defendant claims that such departure was warranted because he was romantically involved with the12-year-old complainant, he had no history of sex crimes, and he was developmentally challenged.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion indenying his request for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level three to a risk level two.A court has the discretion to depart from the presumptive risk level based upon the facts in the record(see People v Hines, 24 AD3d 524,525 [2005]; People v Girup, 9 AD3d913 [2004]; People v Guaman, 8AD3d 545 [2004]). It has been recognized, however, that "[u]tilization of the risk assessmentinstrument will generally 'result in the proper classification in most cases so that departures will be theexception not the rule' " (People v Dexter,21 AD3d 403, 404 [2005], quoting Sex [*2]OffenderRegistration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary, at 4 [Nov. 1997]; see People v Ventura, 24 AD3d 527[2005]; People v Hines, 24 AD3d at 525). A departure from the presumptive risk level iswarranted where "there exists an aggravating or mitigating factor of a kind or to a degree not otherwiseadequately taken into account by the guidelines" (Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk AssessmentGuidelines and Commentary, at 4 [2006]; seePeople v White, 25 AD3d 677 [2006]; People v Guaman, 8 AD3d at 545). Further,there must be clear and convincing evidence of the existence of a special circumstance to warrant anydeparture (see People v Dexter, 21 AD3d at 404). Here, the defendant failed to present clearand convincing evidence of special circumstances warranting such a departure (see People vDexter, 21 AD3d at 404). Moreover, the factors alleged by the defendant do not warrant adownward departure (see People v Velez,38 AD3d 867, 868 [2007]; People v Guaman, 8 AD3d at 545). Skelos, J.P.,Covello, Balkin and Dickerson, JJ., concur.


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