| Matter of Tutunjian v Conroy |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 08162 [55 AD3d 1128] |
| October 28, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Harry J. Tutunjian, Individually and as Mayor of the Cityof Troy, et al., Appellants, v James J. Conroy, as Chair of the Troy City Council Charter Commission,Respondent, et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Thomas V. Kenney Jr., Troy, for James J. Conroy, respondent.
Rose, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Egan, Jr., J.), entered October 21, 2008in Rensselaer County, which dismissed petitioners' application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78 and Election Law § 16-104 (2), to, among other things, enjoin the Rensselaer CountyBoard of Elections from placing a proposed charter amendment by the Troy City Council CharterCommission on the November 4, 2008 general election ballot in the City of Troy, Rensselaer County.
This proceeding involves competing charter revision proposals for the City of Troy, RensselaerCounty—one submitted by a commission appointed by petitioner Harry J. Tutunjian, the Mayorof the City of Troy, and the other submitted by a commission appointed by the Troy City Council. Bothproposals were transmitted by respondent City Clerk of the City of Troy to the Rensselaer CountyBoard of Elections and the Board, in turn, placed identical questions on the November 4, 2008 generalelection ballot—namely, "Shall the new City Charter proposed by the City Charter Commissionbe adopted?"[*2]
Petitioners thereafter commenced this proceeding seeking,among other things, to enjoin the Board from placing the City Council Charter Commission's proposalon the ballot. In so doing petitioners, in addition to asserting various procedural infirmities, contendedthat Municipal Home Rule Law § 36 (5) (e) accords priority to the proposal submitted by theMayor's Charter Commission and, hence, the competing proposals could not simultaneously appear onthe same ballot. Respondent James J. Conroy, the chair of the Troy City Council Charter Commission,answered and commenced a separate proceeding against, among others, the Mayor, seeking toinvalidate the proposal submitted by the Mayor's Charter Commission on procedural grounds.Supreme Court denied both applications, rejecting the parties' various procedural claims andconcluding that the plain language of Municipal Home Rule Law § 36 (5) (e) permittedsubmitting competing charter proposals to the voters at the November 4, 2008 general election. As toany confusion engendered by the Board's placement of identical questions on the ballot, Supreme Courtfound that such confusion could be avoided by identifying each of the proposed charters by theirsource, i.e., the Mayor's Charter Commission's proposal and the City Council Charter Commission'sproposal.[FN1]This appeal by petitioners ensued.
Petitioners, as so limited by their brief, contend only that Municipal Home Rule Law § 36 (5)(e) precludes the voters from considering any charter proposal other than the one submitted by theMayor's Charter Commission.[FN2]We agree.
The dispute here centers upon the construction to be given to Municipal Home Rule Law §36 (5) (e), which provides as follows: "At any election at which any question or questions shall besubmitted to the qualified electors of the city by a charter commission . . . , no otherquestion or questions shall be submitted to or voted upon by such electors pursuant to any local law,ordinance, resolution or petition if such commission was created [by the mayor], and no such otherquestion or questions shall be submitted except by another charter commission if such commission wascreated otherwise, if such other question or questions involve or relate directly or indirectly to theadoption of a new city charter, the amendment of a city charter, charter revision, the establishment of acommission to draft a new or revised city charter, or the functions, powers or duties of any electiveofficer of the city, except as provided in paragraph (g) of this subdivision" (emphasis added).[FN3][*3]
We begin our analysis of whether this statute precludes thevoters from considering any charter proposal other than the one submitted by the Mayor's CharterCommission by reiterating that the "primary consideration . . . in the construction ofstatutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature" (McKinney's Cons Laws ofNY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a], at 176; see A.J. Temple Marble & Tile v Union CarbideMarble Care, 87 NY2d 574, 580 [1996]). To ascertain that intent, we first read the statute literallyand determine whether its language is unambiguous and clearly expresses the Legislature's intent(see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 76; Matter of Sutka vConners, 73 NY2d 395, 403 [1989]). If we find the language to be ambiguous, then we consultthe statute's legislative history for guidance (see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1,Statutes § 120, at 242; Ferres v City of New Rochelle, 68 NY2d 446, 451 [1986];Matter of Rosen v Assessor of City of Troy, 261 AD2d 9, 12 [1999]).
Municipal Home Rule Law § 36 (5) (e) is a densely worded, run-on sentence that describesthe ballot priority of charter revision questions in two discrete circumstances. It begins by describingwhere it applies, namely to an election at which a charter commission is submitting a question. Thestatute subsequently refers to that commission as "such commission." The statute then describes twoprohibitions depending upon how that commission was created. First, if "such commission" werecreated by the mayor, then no other questions "pursuant to any local law, ordinance, resolution orpetition" shall be submitted to the voters. Second, if "such commission" were created otherwise, that is,by the city's legislative body (see Municipal Home Rule Law § 36 [2]) or by the petitionof a specified number of electors (see Municipal Home Rule Law § 36 [3]), then allother questions are precluded from consideration by the voters with one exception. The exception iswhere another charter question was proposed by "another charter commission."
We recognize, however, that this statutory language is ambiguous and can be read, and was readby Supreme Court, to mean that a second charter question could be submitted to the voters regardlessof how the commission proposing the initial charter question was created. We cannot agree with thatinterpretation because it would require an awkward reading of the statute, make the phrase "if suchcommission was created otherwise" redundant and be inconsistent with the legislative history of theamendment that added the language that is causing confusion (see L 1964, ch 592). Contraryto Conroy's contention, the amendment's legislative history shows no intent to extinguish the preexistingpriority of a charter question proposed by a commission created by the mayor (see MunicipalHome Rule Law former § 36 [5] [e]) and expressly comments that the amendment does not doso (see Mem of Citizens Union of City of NY, Bill Jacket, L 1964, ch 592). Rather, thelegislative intent for the addition of the subject language is to make charter questions proposed bycommissions created by the city's legislature and by petition more equal by providing that questionsfrom both sources could appear on the same ballot (see Mem of Citizens Union of City of NY,Bill Jacket, L 1964, ch 592). Given that it was the former dominance of any legislative proposal overone brought by petition that the amendment sought to remedy, we find no further intent to remove thepriority of charter questions proposed by a mayor's commission (see McKinney's Cons Lawsof NY, Book 1, Statutes § 95).
Accordingly, we conclude that Municipal Home Rule Law § 36 (5) (e) gives priority to thecharter question proposed here by the Mayor's Charter Commission, and consideration by the [*4]voters of the charter question submitted by the City Council CharterCommission is precluded on the November 4, 2008 general election ballot.
Mercure, J.P., Lahtinen and Stein, JJ., concur.
Kane, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. While I find that Municipal Home Rule Law § 36(5) (e) could have been drafted with greater clarity, I do not agree that the provision is ambiguous. Inmy view, the overall import is apparent—namely, where, as here, a mayoral commission hasplaced a charter revision proposal on the ballot, no other referendum may be placed on the ballot forthe voters' consideration unless such referendum is a proposal from another charter commission"created otherwise." Such construction is consistent with the language of the challenged subdivision, theletter and spirit of Municipal Home Rule Law § 36 as a whole, which plainly contemplates theplacement of competing charter proposals on the ballot (see e.g. Municipal Home Rule Law§ 36 [5] [d] ["if there be a conflict between the provisions of two or more proposals approvedby the electors at the same election, the proposal receiving the largest number of affirmative votes shallprevail"]), and an opinion from the State Comptroller addressing this very issue (see 1974 OpsSt Comp No. 74-1300 [Feb. 20, 1975]).[FN*]Accordingly, I would affirm Supreme Court's judgment.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof asdismissed petitioners' application; application granted and the Rensselaer County Board of Elections isenjoined from placing a proposed charter amendment by the Troy City Council Charter Commission onthe November 4, 2008 general election ballot; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Footnote 1: Counsel for Conroy advises thisCourt that the Board adopted Supreme Court's suggestion and identified the respective charterproposals in this manner on the absentee and military ballots it sent out to voters.
Footnote 2: As petitioners either failed to briefthe procedural claims raised before Supreme Court or did so for the first time in their reply brief, thoseissues are not properly before us (see Matterof Schmitt v Skovira, 53 AD3d 918, 919 n 2 [2008]; State of New York v Williamson, 8 AD3d 925, 926 n 3 [2004];Fisher v Jackstadt, 291 AD2d 689, 691 n [2002]).
Footnote 3: Municipal Home Rule Law §36 (5) (g) refers to charter amendments or new city charters initiated by petition pursuant to MunicipalHome Rule Law § 37, which is not at issue here.
Footnote *: The Comptroller's opinion provides,in relevant part, that "the prohibition contained in Municipal Home Rule Law, § 36 (5) (e) againstthe submission of certain questions at the same election at which propositions are submitted by acharter commission, does not apply to such questions submitted by another charter commission createdotherwise. Both commissions may submit questions for voter approval at the same general election. . . If two proposed new city charters are submitted at the same election, then the onewhich receives the largest number of affirmative votes prevails" (1974 Ops St Comp No. 74-1300, at 3[Feb. 20, 1975]). Thus, "[a] charter commission may be established by a city governing bodynotwithstanding the existence of such a commission previously created by the city mayor. Bothcommissions may function simultaneously, but separate and independent of each other, and submitquestions for voter approval at the same general election" (1974 Ops St Comp No. 74-1300, at 3[Feb. 20, 1975]).