| Matter of Jara v SMJ Envtl., Inc. |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 08209 [55 AD3d 1157] |
| October 30, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of the Claim of Feliz Amado Jara,Claimant, v SMJ Environmental, Inc., et al., Appellants, and Safeco Insurance Company etal., Respondents. Workers' Compensation Board, Respondent. |
—[*1] McCusker, Anselmi, Rosen & Carvelli, New York City (John B. McCusker of counsel), forClarendon National Insurance, appellant. Miranda, Sokoloff, Sambursky, Slone & Verveniotis, L.L.P., Mineola (Ondine Slone of counsel),for Safeco Insurance Company, respondent. Jones, Jones & O'Connell, L.L.P., New York City (Marc A. Grodsky of counsel), for PrincetonInsurance Company, respondent.
Malone Jr., J. Appeals from two decisions of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed July 20,2005 and August 30, 2006, which, among other things, ruled that an employer-employee relationshipexisted between claimant and SMJ Environmental, Inc.
In January 2000, SMJ Environmental, Inc. and PEO Services, Inc. entered into a contractwhereby SMJ leased laborers from PEO to perform asbestos removal at various construction sites.Pursuant to the contract, PEO was responsible for administering SMJ's payroll and procuring workers'compensation insurance to cover the leased laborers, among other things. However, in July 2000, PEOinformed SMJ that it could no longer provide SMJ with workers' compensation coverage. As a result,SMJ obtained a policy from Frontier Insurance Company.
Claimant, a leased laborer, was injured in December 2000 while removing asbestos and hesubmitted a claim for workers' compensation benefits to SMJ. After numerous hearings on the claim, aWorkers' Compensation Law Judge determined, in two decisions, that SMJ was claimant's soleemployer and that Clarendon National Insurance, as the reinsurer of Frontier, was liable for thepayment of benefits as SMJ's workers' compensation carrier. The Workers' Compensation Boardaffirmed those determinations and SMJ and Clarendon now appeal.
The existence of an employment relationship is a factual question for the Board to resolve and itsdetermination will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Sang Hwan Park v Lee, 53AD3d 936, 937-938 [2008]). In making such determination, the Board is not bound by any singlefactor, "including a contractual provision purporting to establish the existence of an employer-employeerelationship" (Matter of Pilku v 24535Owners Corp., 19 AD3d 722, 723 [2005]; see Matter of Fisher v KJ Transp., 27 AD3d 934, 935 [2006]; see also Matter of Cabrera vTwo-Three-Nought-Four Assoc., 46 AD3d 1255, 1257 [2007]; Matter of Hasbrouck v International Bus.Machs. Corp., 38 AD3d 1146, 1147 [2007]). Here, not only did SMJ concede that itemployed claimant, the record establishes that, among other things, SMJ hired claimant, retained theright to control and direct claimant's work, furnished him with all the equipment necessary to performhis job, was identified as the payor on claimant's paychecks, and retained the right to terminate hisemployment. Notwithstanding the evidence in the record that could support a contrary conclusion,including the terms of the contract between PEO and SMJ, the foregoing provides substantial evidenceto support the Board's determination that SMJ was claimant's employer (see Matter of LaCelle vNew York Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 235 AD2d 694, 694 [1997], lvdismissed 89 NY2d 1085 [1997], lv denied 96 NY2d 713 [2001]; see also Matter ofCabrera v Two-Three-Nought-Four Assoc., 46 AD3d at 1257).
Further, although Clarendon and SMJ argue that they intended SMJ's workers' compensationpolicy to cover only four specific employees, the policy issued by Frontier specifically excluded onlySMJ's president from coverage. Absent any evidence of a specific exclusion as to any other employee,the Board's determination that the policy issued by Frontier [*2]covered all of SMJ's remaining employees, including claimant, issupported by substantial evidence (see Workers' Compensation Law § 54 [4];Matter of Rosenbaum v Lichtenstein, 168 AD2d 873, 874 [1990]; Matter of Daughtrey vEnertex Computer Concepts, 149 AD2d 872, 873 [1989]).
The remaining contentions of Clarendon and SMJ have been considered and determined to bewithout merit.
Mercure, J.P., Spain, Carpinello and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decisions are affirmed,without costs.