| County of Broome v Badger |
| 2008 NY Slip Op 08230 [55 AD3d 1191] |
| October 30, 2008 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| County of Broome, Respondent, v Kenneth E. Badger et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Joseph Sluzar, County Attorney, Binghamton, for respondent.
Rose, J. Appeals (1) from an order and amended order of the Supreme Court (Monserrate,J.H.O.), entered April 2, 2007 and April 23, 2007 in Broome County, which, among other things,granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and (2) from the judgment entered thereon.
Sometime prior to 1996, the Legislature of plaintiff, County of Broome, adopted a resolution whichpromulgated a personnel rule describing when and what payment would be made to administrativeemployees for unused sick time. The rule stated: "Upon retirement from County employment anemployee shall be paid for all credited sick leave which is in excess of that which may be applied toyears of service for retirement purposes under New York State Retirement Law § 41j." In 2000,the Legislature amended the first phrase of the rule to state: "Upon separation from Countyemployment" (emphasis added). No other change was made to the rule and there is no dispute that therelevant number of days of sick leave that may be applied for retirement purposes is 165 (seeRetirement and Social Security Law § 41 [j] [1] [a]). Nor is it disputed that, from the date of theamendment in 2000 until 2004, the rule was uniformly interpreted and applied to all separatingemployees, whether their separation was due to retirement or not, so that only those employees wholeft service with more than 165 days of sick leave were paid for unused sick time and then only for thedays in excess of 165. This was the same way the rule had been interpreted and applied to retiringemployees before the amendment.
In 2004, however, the County Executive changed the interpretation of the rule to make it [*2]consistent with the provisions of plaintiff's labor union contracts fornonadministrative personnel and, as a result, when defendants left plaintiff's employment that year,whether because they retired or simply separated without retiring, they received payment for all of theirunused sick leave. A new County Executive took office in 2005 and disputed the new interpretation,asserting that only unused sick time in excess of 165 days should have been paid. Plaintiff thencommenced this action to recover the alleged overpayment and, following disclosure, moved forsummary judgment. Supreme Court held that the intent of the Legislature to compensate separatedadministrative employees for their unused sick time only in excess of 165 days was plainly expressed inthe language of the rule and granted plaintiff's motion. We now affirm.
When interpreting a legislative enactment, a court's primary consideration "is to ascertain and giveeffect to the intention of the Legislature" (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463[2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). To that end, "[t]he statutory text is the clearestindicator of legislative intent and courts should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plainmeaning" (Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. vSpitzer, 7 NY3d 653, 660 [2006]; see Matter of Amorosi v South Colonie Ind. Cent. School Dist., 9 NY3d367, 373 [2007]; Matter of Sweeney vDennison, 52 AD3d 882, 883 [2008]; Matter of United Univ. Professions v State of New York, 36 AD3d 297,299 [2006]).
Here, the plain meaning of the language of the rule clearly expresses the intent of the Legislature.No one disputes that the effect of the amendment in 2000, which changed the word "retirement" to"separation," was to extend the benefit set forth in the rule to all administrative employees who left theCounty regardless of the reason. Given that the way the benefit is measured—the time in excessof 165 days—was not changed when the rule's application was expanded, there is no merit indefendants' claim that the wording of the rule now requires plaintiff to pay those employees whoseparate without retiring differently from those who retire. Yet defendants contend that the rule shouldbe interpreted to require payment for any sick days that are not actually applied to years of service forretirement purposes, which would be the case if an employee separated without retiring. We simplynote that the use of the term "may" in describing the payments as being "in excess of that which may beapplied to years of service for retirement purposes" expresses no more than a possibility which doesnot require actual retirement. It merely measures plaintiff's payment by limiting it to the number of sickdays in excess of those which could qualify for application to years of service if the employee were toretire. In addition, if the intent of the Legislature were to pay separating administrative employees whodid not retire for all unused sick days, the limitation language would be surplusage as to them. WhileSupreme Court's plain reading of the language may not be consistent with the way plaintiff's labor unioncontracts treat this issue, it is the way in which the Legislature chose to deal with its unrepresentedadministrative employees. Since this reading gave effect to all the words used and its interpretation wasunstrained, we agree that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment.
Defendants' remaining contentions, including their argument that plaintiff should be estopped fromseeking to recover the overpayments in light of the past actions and statements of its officials, areequally unavailing (see e.g. Matter of Parkview Assoc. v City of New York, 71 NY2d 274,282 [1988], appeal dismissed and cert denied 488 US 801 [1988]).
Mercure, J.P., Peters, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order, amended order andjudgment are affirmed, without costs.